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Abstract 
We investigate how political backlash against wealthy second home investors in 
high-amenity places – tourist areas and superstar cities – affects local residents. We 
exploit a quasi-natural experiment: the ‘Swiss Second Home Initiative’ (SHI), 
which banned the construction of new second homes in desirable tourist locations. 
Consistent with our model, we find that the SHI lowered transaction prices of 
primary homes in affected areas by around 12% but did not adversely affect prices 
of second homes. Our findings suggest that the negative effect on local economies 
dominated positive amenity-preservation effects. Constraining second home 
investments may reinforce rather than reduce wealth inequality. 
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1 Introduction 
In this paper we explore a recent global phenomenon; the surge of investment in ‘second homes’ 
– properties that are not used as primary residence – and the subsequent political backlash 
against wealthy investors in such properties. Our main focus is on the impact of constraining 
second home investments on local residents and the value of their primary residences. 
Exploiting a unique quasi-natural experiment in Switzerland – the ‘Second Home Initiative’ 
(SHI) that was narrowly approved by voters in March 2012 – we find that the effective ban on 
the construction of new second homes in touristic areas has substantially lowered the value of 
residents’ primary homes in these areas. Our most conservative estimates suggest that 
constraining second home investments lowered prices of primary residences in affected 
municipalities by around 12%. We also explore the effects of the ban on the price of second 
homes. The estimated effect is positive, albeit statistically insignificant. 
The number of second homes across the globe has surged dramatically over the last two 
decades, and particularly in recent years, fueled by rising earnings and wealth accumulation 
among a growing cohort of ‘top earners’. The lack of alternative investment opportunities in 
recent years – a consequence of the low interest environment – may have additionally 
contributed to the surge.  
In Switzerland alone there are currently around 600,000 second homes – almost one such home 
for every five households. Yet, the investment boom in second homes is neither just a Swiss 
phenomenon nor is it confined to touristic countries. It is a world-wide phenomenon. Countries 
such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, or Singapore have seen a 
dramatic increase in wealthy individuals investing in second homes in recent years. Within these 
countries, major cities – such as New York, London or Paris – and popular tourist regions 
observed the most pronounced investment booms. 
In the United States, the number of second homes increased by about 20% to 6.8 million 
between 1995 and 2005 alone (Belsky et al., 2007). In the United Kingdom, according to the 
English Housing Survey, the number of second homes more than doubled between 1995 and 
2013, to 671,000 units.1 The rise of the market for second homes is perhaps most dramatic in 
China. In 2002, 6.6% of all urban households owned a second home. By 2007, this share surged 
to 15% (Huang and Yi, 2011). Finally, in France, according to the French National Institute of 
Statistics and Economic Studies, INSEE, by 2014, second homes represented 9.3% of the total 
housing stock.   
The surge in second home investments has triggered a serious political backlash in many 
countries, reflecting a diverse array of concerns. Critically, wealthy second home investors – 
especially foreign ones – are being blamed for the dramatic house price increases in many 
desirable high-amenity locations – tourist places as well as superstar cities such as New York 
or London.2 Antipathy to new second home investors may also reflect “an ugly dislike of 
outsiders” or in some cases even “NIMBYism of second home investors themselves, keen to 
                                                          
1 This number is fairly low relative to the size of the country. This is because the UK has an extraordinarily 
restrictive planning system that focuses on urban containment, driving up house prices (Hilber and Vermeulen, 
2016) and thereby encouraging British investors to buy in nearby countries such as France or Spain. 
2 A national poll conducted for the Observer and Guardian Cities in April 2016 suggested that survey respondents 
mainly blamed ‘immigration’ and ‘foreign investors buying up property’ for Britain’s housing crisis. Fifty-one 
percent of survey respondents thought foreign investors had a “significant impact”. 
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preserve the exclusiveness of their holiday patch” (The Economist, 2016). This antipathy may 
be further reinforced by a growing number of wealthy at the top end and rising wealth inequality 
(Rognlie, 2014) in conjunction with jealousy motives. The proposition that the political 
backlash is driven by jealousy motives of the less wealthy is consistent with a simple analysis 
of the SHI-voting outcome: The SHI found most support in municipalities with a high share of 
renters, low incomes and low second home rates.3   
Other concerns relate more directly to the impact of owners of second homes in the affected 
localities: The uncontrolled construction of second homes may blight the beautiful landscape 
in touristic areas. Moreover, second homes typically stay empty for much of the year, creating 
a ghost town atmosphere outside tourist seasons, yet generating little or no local tax revenue.  
One prime example of political backlash is the UK, where the then Chancellor George Osborne 
announced a 3% hike on the stamp duty of second homes, effective from April 2016.4 Popular 
tourist destinations located on the South West coast of the country – such as Lynton and 
Lynmouth in Devon and, recently, St. Ives and Carbis Bay in Cornwall – went a step further 
and adopted complete bans on second homes to limit the investors’ footprint (the ban in St. Ives 
and Carbis Bay was backed by 83% of the voters).  
Another example is New York City. In 2012, the city abolished a 20% tax-abatement for owners 
of condos that were not primary residences. More recently, the Fiscal Policy Institute proposed 
a steep property tax surcharge on the city’s expensive pied-à-terre residences.  
Similar policies were enacted in Continental Europe. For example, in France, the national 
government approved a law in 2014, allowing municipalities with overheating housing markets 
to introduce a property tax on second homes of up to 20%. In Denmark, municipalities grant 
building permits for summer cottages only if projects meet stringent planning requirements – 
mainly intended to preserve the coastline. These restrictions were imposed mainly to prevent 
an inflow of (foreign) investors.  
The political backlash against second home investors is not confined to Europe and the US. The 
Chinese government for example announced a whole series of measures to curb second home 
investment. These include drastic minimum requirements on down-payments in the entire 
country (although recently somewhat relaxed) and even more drastic measures in certain cities 
such as Beijing, where single-person households were banned from buying more than one 
residence and where a 20% capital gains tax on property was imposed. In a similar vein, 
Singapore’s government introduced several measures between 2010 and 2015 including an 
additional stamp duty tax and increased compulsory down-payments to discourage second 
home investments. In Australia, a review board ensures that the purchase of existing properties 
by foreign investors benefits local communities. It precludes purchases by foreign buyers for 
investment motives (buy-to-let or expected capital gains) or for “weekender” recreational use. 
Finally, Israel introduced a property tax increase on second homes in 2015 with the intent to 
fight so called ‘phantom apartments’.  
                                                          
3 We discuss these results in more detail in Section 3. Regression results are reported in Appendix Table A1.  
4 We provide newspaper references to this and other second home policies proposed or implemented in various 
countries in Web-Appendix A.   
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To date we know little about the consequences of these policies and, in particular, we lack 
evidence on the impact of restrictions on the construction or ownership of second homes vis-à-
vis instruments that tax non-primary residences. 
In our empirical analysis we exploit a unique quasi-natural experiment – the SHI – to explore 
the impact of a constraint on the construction of new second homes in high-amenity places. The 
SHI stipulates that in municipalities with a share of second homes – determined prior to the 
initiative’s approval – of over 20%, investors are not allowed to plan and build any new second 
homes going forward, though primary residences built prior to 2013 can still be converted into 
second homes. Fiscal authorities in Switzerland legally categorize all housing units as either 
‘primary’ or ‘second’ homes depending on whether or not a household uses a housing unit as 
primary residence.5 There is certainty about whether a unit is a primary residence because 
households only pay local income taxes in their primary place of residence (i.e., in the place 
where they live more than half of the year).6  
In theory, both quantity restrictions and taxes could be efficient means to internalize alleged 
negative externalities caused by second home investors (Weitzman, 1974)7. In practice, 
however, market restrictions and regulations often have unintended consequences.8 In this 
paper, we explore the potential intended and unintended consequences on the market for 
primary homes of constraining second home investments (as a potential alternative to 
disproportionally taxing them via a local property or land value tax).  
When conducting our analysis, we faced four main challenges. The first challenge is of a 
theoretical nature: to understand the mechanisms through which a constraint on second homes 
may affect the price of primary and second homes. To this end, we develop a simple dynamic 
general equilibrium framework. We first consider a setting in which primary and second homes 
effectively trade in separate markets (i.e., are poor substitutes). Still the two housing markets 
are linked: a growing number of wealthy second home investors positively affects local 
economies (including local wages) but adversely affects the primary residents’ valuation of 
local amenities. Our model yields two main propositions: The ban adversely affects the 
equilibrium price of primary homes (Proposition 1) but positively affects the equilibrium price 
of second homes (Proposition 2).  
We also consider the converse setting in which primary and second homes are perfect 
substitutes and consequently trade in the same market. In this case, the price of existing primary 
and second homes must move in the same direction. Whether this direction is positive or 
negative is theoretically ambiguous. 
                                                          
5 The second home status does not depend on the tenure (owner-occupied vs. renter-occupied) of the unit. 
Developers can still build rental properties—sometimes labelled ‘investment properties’—post 2012 but, crucially, 
renter-occupiers must live in these new units permanently, not just during the tourist season. 
6 Cantonal inspectors can monitor an occupier’s presence in a second home. They can also conduct surprise visits 
for control purposes if they suspect misconduct. In a similar vein, in Israel authorities check the water usage of 
properties to determine whether an occupier may falsely claim to use a property as second home. 
7 This theoretical argument only holds for technological externalities that are associated with market failure (e.g., 
negative vision externalities) but not for pecuniary externalities (e.g., primary house prices increase because of 
investor-driven demand in the local market).  
8 One such example is rent control that has been associated with significant welfare costs from misallocation across 
demographic subgroups (Glaeser and Luttmer, 2003). 
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Our empirical evidence, which reveals a strong negative effect of the ban on the price of primary 
homes but an insignificant positive effect on the price of second homes, seems largely consistent 
with the view that primary and second homes may be rather poor substitutes in the case of Swiss 
tourist areas. The fact that the number of transactions from primary residents to other primary 
residents did not decrease post-ban (i.e., few primary residents appear to have exercised their 
conversion option) provides further support for the notion that primary and second homes trade 
in separate markets. 
The second challenge concerns the estimation of the treatment effect on the price of primary 
homes. Although the treatment assignment variable – which is a deterministic function of 
second home rates – is pre-determined, it may correlate with unobserved dynamic price 
fundamentals at the municipality level. For example, if the second home rate of a municipality 
positively correlates with its proximity to major amenities – such as attractive skiing areas – 
and demand for this proximity increases over time, then the treatment variable is not exogenous, 
and accounting for municipality fixed-effects does not solve the problem.9  
To counter this potential endogeneity, we employ two different strategies. The first strategy 
allows for different time trends in our explanatory variables and – in particular – second home 
rates. The estimated effects remain stable when we allow for time trend differentials. Our 
second strategy is to restrict the sample to municipalities whose second home rates belong to a 
reasonably narrow interval containing the threshold value. We document results for the [0.1, 
0.5] and [0.15, 0.3] intervals. This approach, which corresponds to a parametric regression 
discontinuity design, allows us to focus on “similar” municipalities by way of excluding most 
major urban areas and highly touristic municipalities. It thus addresses the concern that 
unobserved price dynamics might be correlated with the treatment itself. Reassuringly, our 
estimated effects of interest hardly change. 
The third challenge is the possibility that the market for primary residences may experience 
policy-induced compositional changes in the characteristics of traded properties. One recurring 
feature of the literature on the estimation of treatment effects using hedonic models10 is the 
implicit assumption that the treatment exclusively affects the dependent variable of interest 
leaving explanatory variables unaffected.  The validity of this assumption depends on the nature 
of the experimental setting itself and, as pointed out by Angrist and Pischke (2009), on the 
timing of the measurement of explanatory variables with respect to the dependent one.  
In the case of the SHI, the assumption is likely invalid when control variables are measured 
post policy implementation: the ban slows the economic development of touristic places, and, 
consequently, fewer new properties change hands. The proposition that the composition of the 
traded properties did not change post policy – in particular with respect to age-related 
characteristics – seems to be too far-fetched to ignore. To address this concern we conduct a 
mediation analysis as suggested by Imai et al. (2010) and Imai et al. (2011) and as recently 
employed by Heckman et al. (2013) and Heckman and Pinto (2015). Specifically, we include 
                                                          
9 A similar problem may arise for fiscal trends because in Switzerland local taxes apply at the place of primary 
residence. Low fiscal burdens are capitalized into higher house prices (Basten et al., 2014; Hilber, forthcoming). 
10 A vast and thriving literature considers the estimation of treatment effects using hedonic models – most 
prominent examples include, Chay and Greenstone (2005), Greenstone and Gallagher (2008), or Cellini et al. 
(2010). This literature has contributed greatly to our understanding of how environmental (dis)amenities and public 
policies capitalize into housing prices. 
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contemporaneous controls in our model and estimate the importance of the compositional 
change with respect to the treatment assignment.  
We find that including contemporaneous controls and taking into account the mediation effect 
of age-related characteristics does not substantially alter the magnitude of the estimated total 
price drop, which is about 10 per cent after taking into account mediation effects. We do, 
however, find that the implementation of the policy significantly altered age-related 
characteristics of traded properties. This explains 23% of the total price decline.  
A final challenge is the fact that our estimate of the impact of the SHI-imposed ban on the price 
of primary homes is a ‘net effect’. As we point out in our model, constraints on second home 
investments have two opposing effects; a negative effect via adversely affecting the local 
economy and a positive effect via preserving the landscape. In an attempt to identify these two 
mechanisms, we estimate a heterogeneous treatment effect model. We proxy the adverse local 
economy effect with the share of votes against the SHI (a higher share of no votes implies a 
stronger adverse effect on the local economy) and the positive landscape effect with the share 
of unproductive land (such as lakes, glaciers, etc.) in the municipality. (More unproductive land 
implies a higher natural amenity value.) We interact these two proxy variables separately with 
the treatment variable and, all else equal, indeed find a negative effect of the SHI in places with 
a higher share of no votes and a positive effect in places with high natural amenity values. The 
implied net effect is again negative and of a similar magnitude as in our base specification. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss the related 
literature. Section 3 discusses the institutional setting and the specifics of the SHI. The next 
section presents a simple dynamic general equilibrium model with for the empirical analysis. 
Section 5 discusses the data and provides descriptive statistics. We outline our empirical setup 
in Section 6 and present main results and robustness checks in Section 7. The final section 
concludes.  
2 Related Literature 
Our paper relates to a relatively small but growing recent literature that focuses on the role 
played by residential real estate investors in housing markets. To begin with, Haughwout et al. 
(2014) investigate the role of investors in the recent U.S. housing crisis. Three main findings 
arise from their analysis. First, investors are overrepresented in states that display the strongest 
boom-bust cycles. Second, investors misreporting their occupancy status to obtain better credit 
conditions had the tendency to bid more aggressively during the boom than owner-occupiers 
and admitted investors. Third, investors defaulted at a higher rate during the bust phase than 
owner-occupiers.  
Chinco and Mayer (2016) compare local second home buyers to out-of-town investors. They 
find that out-of-town buyers – unlike local second home buyers – behave as misinformed 
speculators, increasing future house prices and the implied-to-actual rent ratio. They develop 
an estimation strategy taking into account the possible reverse causality between housing prices 
and the out-of-town demand of investors. In a related paper, Bayer et al. (2015) classify 
investors into two categories according to their observed investment strategies: middlemen and 
speculators. The former group aims to make profit by buying from motivated sellers at prices 
below the market value and re-selling quickly, whereas the latter group times their investments 
to markets displaying strong price increases. By excluding the possibility that speculators 
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possess superior information on housing price dynamics, they indirectly establish a causal link 
between speculative behavior and housing price bubbles.  
Three recent papers focus on international second home investments in major world cities. 
Cvijanovic and Spaenjers (2015) explore the effect of international demand for luxury 
secondary residences in Paris. They point out how investors concentrate in specific areas, 
increasing local housing prices. In line with Chinco and Mayer (2016), they find that foreign 
investors realize lower capital gains compared to local ones. Badarinza and Ramadorai (2015) 
focus on London and document how foreign real estate investors possess a “home bias abroad”. 
They invest in areas displaying high shares of residents of the same country thus affecting 
housing prices and transaction volumes. Finally, Suher (2016) explores the response of non-
resident owners of second homes in New York City to targeted annual property taxes. Using the 
city’s 2013 change in the property tax treatment of condominiums, he documents that non-
resident buyers have a significant impact on house prices within a subset of highly desirable 
neighborhoods, but no impact outside of these areas.  
Overall, the literature appears to support the widespread concern that non-resident investors 
into residential real estate increase local house prices and fuel market instability. This gives 
potential legitimacy to policies that aim to constrain non-resident real estate investments either 
by imposing higher local taxes on non-primary owners or by constraining the quantity of such 
investments. To date, we know little about the effects of such investment constraints on local 
housing market outcomes. This paper aims to fill this gap. 
Our contribution to the literature is fourfold. First, we develop a simple dynamic general 
equilibrium model that describes the opposing forces affecting the price of primary and second 
homes. Second, we provide corresponding evidence that quantifies not only the net effect of a 
ban on new second homes on the price of primary homes but also the direction and economic 
significance of the opposing channels at work. Third, we propose an econometric approach to 
distinguish the direct effect of the policy on the price of primary homes from compositional 
changes of the traded housing characteristics. Fourth, our analysis also considers mid- and long-
term investors and does not exclusively focus on short-term speculators. The latter do not fully 
capture the significance of the global second home investment phenomenon. The presence of 
short-term, often inexperienced, speculators may only be one of the ultimate symptoms 
associated with overheating local housing markets.  
3 Institutional background and the Second Home Initiative (SHI) 
Popular initiatives are an instrument of direct democracy that allows Swiss citizens to modify 
the country’s constitution. Supporters of an initiative are required to collect 100’000 valid 
signatures in favor of the initiative within 18 months. In order to avoid undue influence of 
populous regions (in Switzerland called ‘cantons’ and ‘half-cantons’), the initiative must be 
approved by the majority of voters and cantons. Popular initiatives have a low approval rate: 
up to April 2015 only 22 out of 198 initiatives obtained dual majority.11 This is for two reasons. 
First, popular initiatives are often considered extreme and meant to send a signal to policy 
makers rather than being intended to actually modify the constitution. Second, authorities are 
                                                          
11 See http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/vi/vis_2_2_5_9.html for further details.  
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allowed to formulate a more moderate counter-proposal, often leading proponents to withdraw 
the initiative.  
Supporters of the SHI collected enough validated signatures by January 2008. The Federal 
Council, the Parliament, most of the political parties and economic organizations recommended 
to vote against the initiative.12 Thus it came as a surprise when in March 2012 Swiss voters 
approved the SHI with the narrowest of margins; 50.6% of the votes and 13.5 of the 26 
cantons.13 Although voting polls suggested a tight majority in favor of the initiative is feasible, 
its approval by the majority of cantons was a complete bolt from the blue.  
On January 1st, 2013 the SHI ordinance came into force, banning construction of new second 
homes in municipalities where such homes represented 20% or more of the total housing stock. 
Two elements of the ordinance are particularly relevant for our analysis. First, second homes 
that had obtained a construction permit prior to the vote were still allowed to be built after the 
ordinance came into force. This prevented the number of newly built second homes above the 
threshold to fall to zero in the years just after the approval of the initiative. Second, primary 
homes built – or possessing a construction permit issued – before the ordinance came into force 
(i.e., before 2013) may still be converted into second homes, but those planned and built after 
the ordinance was enacted lost their conversion option.14  
Both elements of the ordinance were defined after the approval of the initiative, thus they were 
unknown to the voters prior to August 2012. Although the wording of the initiative had to be 
introduced into the Swiss constitution, implementation-specifics (and conformity with existing 
laws) were open to debate. In fact, the final text of a popular initiative is usually an arm-wrestled 
compromise between politicians supporting the initiative and those representing lobbies’ 
interests. Therefore, the uncertainty concerning the specific implementation of the SHI made 
anticipation strategies extremely unlikely even after the voting results were known.  
Figure 1 illustrates a strong positive correlation between the SHI-share of no votes and the share 
of second homes in a municipality. This positive association survives when we conduct a simple 
analysis of voting results at municipality level and control for other confounding factors such 
as voter turnout, income, homeownership rate, distance to major urban centers, or distance to 
major ski resorts. Detailed findings are reported in Appendix Table A1.  
Treated areas in our setting – mountainous and other areas near lakes with shares of second 
homes above 20% – typically possess local economies that are reliant on tourism. A majority 
of voters in these areas, on balance, benefit substantially from the investment home industry, 
directly or indirectly. It is therefore no surprise that the majority of local residents – especially 
in municipalities with very high shares of second homes and high homeownership rates – were 
strongly opposed to the SHI. The last column in Appendix Table A1 illustrates this persuasively: 
                                                          
12 See https://www.parlament.ch/de/services/volksabstimmungen/fruehere-volksabstimmungen/ 
volksabstimmungen-2012/volksabstimmung-2012-03-11.  
13 Switzerland counts 6 half-cantons. The SHI was approved by 12 cantons and 3 half-cantons. 
14 Initially the ‘conversion option’ was confined to sales that did not trigger the construction of a new primary 
home in the treated or another nearby municipality. This measure intended to avoid speculative behavior of primary 
homeowners. However, the restriction was not included in the final law – implemented in January 2016 – because 
policy makers deemed it ineffective, likely for two reasons. First, mobile skilled individuals are likely to move 
over longer distances, so the restriction would not prevent them from moving away and pocketing the proceeds 
from the conversion option. Second, implementation (coordination across local jurisdictions) would have been 
very difficult and costly to monitor. 
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the higher the share of second homes, the higher the homeownership rate, the closer a 
municipality to a major ski resort, the higher the voter turnout, and the higher the number of tax 
payers and the average income, the more strongly permanent residents were opposed to the 
SHI. This is suggestive that – consistent with our main findings – permanent local residents in 
the affected areas weighed the adverse economic effects of the SHI much more strongly than 
the positive effects highlighted forcefully by the supporters of the initiative (preservation of 
beautiful landscape and views, prevention of a ghost-town atmosphere, and avoidance of 
negative fiscal externalities).  
The voters in the affected areas, despite their strong opposition and turnout, did not manage to 
prevent the approval of the SHI. This is because voters in populous and non-touristic (control) 
areas also had a say. A simple voting analysis of these non-treated areas – reported in column 2 
of Appendix Table A1 – indicates that the overall support may have been mainly driven by 
jealousy motives of voters with little wealth: the higher the share of renters and the lower the 
income in a non-treated municipality the stronger was support in favor of the SHI. Moreover, 
perhaps driven by an ‘existence value’ associated with preserved landscape, the further away 
voters lived from high amenity places (and therefore the higher the travel cost associated with 
a second home) the greater was their likelihood to support the SHI.  
4 The Model 
In this section, we present a simple dynamic general equilibrium model in the spirit of Rosen 
(1979) and Roback (1982). We build on recent work by Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) who 
provide a general spatial equilibrium setting for the structural analysis of housing prices, wages, 
and population growth when agglomeration economies are present.15  
We consider a system of local jurisdictions that differ in the quality of major natural amenities, 
such as mountains or lakes (but an amenity could also be interpreted e.g. as the touristic or 
consumer center of a superstar city). High quality amenities attract second home investors and 
increase the production efficiency of firms that exploit these amenities, leading local economies 
to exclusively specialize in the tourism sector. Mobile workers choose their primary residence 
by sorting across local jurisdictions according to wages, housing prices, natural amenities, and 
the negative externalities caused by second home investors. Investors generate such 
externalities via adversely affecting the landscape and creating ghost towns. 
One key assumption in our model is that primary and second homes trade in two distinct 
markets within each local jurisdiction, that is, the two markets have separate demand and supply 
functions. This implies that primary and second homes are poor substitutes. In section 4.6 we 
discuss the contrasting case of perfect substitutability along with predictions.  
The assumption of poor substitutability does not seem farfetched. It arises when second home 
investors and primary residents differ in their preferences for the micro-location within 
municipalities or for the layout of a property. For example, second home investors tend to have 
strong preferences for nice views onto mountaintops or lakes or for quick access to ski lifts. 
These micro-locations are typically scarce. Vice versa, primary residents tend to strongly value 
good access to employment opportunities, local schools or supermarkets. Moreover, the layout 
                                                          
15 Our theoretical framework also relates to recent work by Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013), Hsieh and Moretti 
(2015), and Gaubert (2015).  
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of permanent homes often differs starkly from that of second homes. Differences in preferences 
for micro-locations and layouts, within municipality heterogeneity in locational access to 
amenities and services, and differences in the layouts of properties may thus effectively create 
separate markets. Strong wealth differentials between well-off second home investors and less 
well-off primary residents may further reinforce this market separation.  
4.1 Tourism industry 
The local tourism industry produces non-tradable goods and services such as local ski lifts or 
restauration services that are sold to second home investors. We assume that residents in the 
municipality supply one unit of labor inelastically and we ignore cross-commuting, such that 
the number of local residents corresponds to local employment. Following Glaeser and Gottlieb 
(2009) and Hsieh and Moretti (2015), the output of firms is characterized by a Cobb-Douglas 
production function that displays decreasing returns to scale at the aggregate level:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝛽
𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝛾?̅?𝑖
1−𝛽−𝛾
,      0 < 𝛽, 𝛾 < 1, 𝛽 + 𝛾 < 1  (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡, 𝑁𝑖𝑡, and 𝐾𝑖𝑡 represent local output, employment, and traded capital in municipality 𝑖 
at time 𝑡, respectively; 𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the local total factor productivity; ?̅?𝑖 represents the municipality 
fixed stock of non-traded capital (e.g. land) that makes returns to scale decreasing at the 
municipality level but constant for individual firms. The industry is assumed to be perfectly 
competitive and firms choose the level of the factors of production to maximize their profits. 
Traded capital is supplied with infinite elasticity at an exogenous price set equal to 1. Labour 
and capital first order conditions lead to the labour demand equation:  
𝑁𝑖𝑡 ∝ 𝐴𝑖𝑡
1
1−𝛽−𝛾𝑝𝑖𝑡
1
1−𝛽−𝛾𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝛾−1
1−𝛽−𝛾
.  (2) 
4.2 Local residents  
Local residents are perfectly mobile and equalize their indirect Cobb-Douglas utility function  
𝑉𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 𝜂 𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑎 ,       0 < 𝑎 < 1,  𝜃𝑖 > 0, 𝜂 < 0  (3) 
across municipalities, where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 represents the cost of local housing in the considered time 
period – i.e. the rental cost or the periodical cost of homeownership – and 𝑊𝑖𝑡 denotes the wages 
paid by the local tourism industry. The term 𝜃𝑖𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 𝜂 denotes an endogenous amenity index that 
decreases as the number of second home investors 𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮  in the municipality increases. In our 
context, the factor 𝜃𝑖 reflects either the exogenously given value of natural amenities or the 
quality of the social-life in the municipality. The value primary residents attach to this index 
evolves dynamically according to the negative externalities imposed by second home investors. 
The parameter 𝑎 is the constant expenditure share on housing.   
4.3 Second home investors  
Second home investors sort across municipalities to maximize their indirect Cobb-Douglas 
utility, which we assume depends on the optimal consumption of tourism services, housing, and 
natural amenities:  
𝑉𝑡
𝒮 = 𝜃𝑖
𝒮𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 𝜖 𝑊𝑡
𝒮
𝑝𝑖𝑡
1−𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝒮 𝑏 ,      0 < 𝑏 < 1,  𝜃𝑖
𝒮 > 0, 𝜖 < 0,     (4) 
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where 𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝒮 represents the local second home market housing cost, 𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the price of tourism 
services, and  𝑊𝑡
𝒮 denotes the exogenous wages of second home investors that are determined 
outside our system of municipalities.16 Similar to the case of primary residents, the amenity 
index 𝜃𝑖
𝒮𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 𝜖 reflects the dislike of an investor for the presence of other investors. (The 
endogenous amenity index could also be interpreted as congestion costs associated with the 
consumption of tourism services such as the use of ski lifts.) The parameter 𝑏 is the constant 
expenditure share on housing of second home investors.  
4.4 Housing developers  
We describe the problem of developers of primary residences following Glaeser (2008). 
(Developers of second homes solve a similar optimization problem. See Appendix B.) Let us 
assume that in every municipality at an arbitrary point in time 𝑡0 < 𝑡 there is a fixed supply of 
housing units 𝐻𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑡0
𝜌𝑖  – where 𝐻𝑖, 𝜌𝑖 > 0 are parameters affecting the supply elasticity – that can 
be built at a unitary cost of 𝐶𝑖𝑡0 or less and sold at the market price 𝑃𝑖𝑡0. Prices and 
heterogeneous construction costs are assumed to increase at steady state rates 𝑔𝑖 and 𝑔𝑖
𝑐, 
respectively, prior to the ban. Both rates are lower than the interest rate 𝑟. Profit maximizing 
developers choose the optimal period 𝑡 in which to develop and sell a property. The profit at 𝑡0 
of developing a plot of land is given by the discounted value of the future property price 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = (1 + 𝑔)
𝑡−𝑡0𝑃𝑖𝑡0 less the discounted value of its future unit cost 𝐶𝑡 = (1 + 𝑔
𝑐)𝑡−𝑡0𝐶𝑖𝑡0:   
max
𝑡
((1 + 𝑟)−(𝑡−𝑡0)((1 + 𝑔𝑖)
𝑡−𝑡0𝑃𝑖𝑡0  − (1 +  𝑔𝑖
𝑐)𝑡−𝑡0𝐶𝑖𝑡0)) ,   𝑡 ≥ 𝑡0.   (5) 
Marginal development in period 𝑡 occurs when either the optimal stopping rule obtained by 
time-deriving the continuous-time version of (5) is satisfied, or when the profit function 
decreases with time. In that case, waiting to develop harms housing developers.  
As we assume that primary (𝒫) and secondary (𝒮) residences are produced by two distinct 
supply functions, the housing supply of each type of residence is then given by 
𝐻𝑖
𝑗 (
𝑟−𝑔𝑖
𝑗
(1+ 𝑔
𝑖
𝑗,𝑐
)
𝑡−𝑡0
(𝑟−𝑔
𝑖
𝑗,𝑐
) 
𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑗)
𝜌
,    𝑗 ∈ {𝒫, 𝒮}.  (6) 
For ease of exposition, in what follows we only report the 𝒮 superscript to distinguish second 
homes from primary ones.  
We model a ban on second homes as the limiting case of an increase in the cost of producing 
such houses. By exogenously increasing  𝑔𝑖
𝒮,𝑐 the second home supply becomes more inelastic. 
If the increase in costs is large enough, the supply will become perfectly inelastic, which 
corresponds to a ban on second homes. Comparative static results based on the growth of 
construction costs of second homes thus correspond to those of a ban of such homes.  
                                                          
16 The wage 𝑊𝑡
𝒮  can be thought of as the share of wage investors spend where their second home is located. This 
is the case, for example, if second home investors – which consume composite goods and services 𝑐𝑖𝑡 and housing 
𝐻𝑖𝑡  where their primary residence is located (location 𝑖) and touristic services 𝑐𝑙𝑡  and housing 𝐻𝑙𝑡  where they own 
a second   home (location 𝑙) – have preferences according to a nested Cobb-Douglas function of the form 
𝑈𝒮(𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝑢𝑙𝑡) = (𝑢𝑖𝑡)
𝑠1(𝑢𝑙𝑡)
1−𝑠1  with  𝑢𝑘𝑡 = 𝜃𝑘𝑡(𝑐𝑘𝑡)
1−𝑠𝑘(𝐻𝑘𝑡)
𝑠𝑘 , 𝑘 = 𝑖, 𝑙. Then investors spend a constant share 
(1 − 𝑠1) of their “total” wage 𝑊𝑡 in location 𝑙, i.e.  𝑊𝑡
𝒮 = (1 − 𝑠1)𝑊𝑡. 
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4.5 Equilibrium prices 
Having stated the problem of firms in the tourism sector, primary residents, second home 
investors, and housing developers, we can solve for the equilibrium solution of the system. To 
link the endogenous stock price of primary and secondary residences to the value of their 
housing flows, we use the standard dynamic price equation: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑗 = ∑
𝑟𝑖𝑡+𝑙
𝑗
(1+𝑟)𝑙
=
1+𝑟
𝑟−𝑔
𝑖
𝑗
+∞
𝑙=0 𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑗  , 𝑗 ∈ {𝒫, 𝒮} , (7) 
where we assume that rents grow at a steady state rate 𝑔𝑖
𝑗
. We can now define the concept of 
dynamic equilibrium: 
DEFINITION 1.  A dynamic equilibrium is a vector (
𝑊𝑖𝑡+1
𝑊𝑖𝑡
,
𝑃𝑖𝑡+1
𝑃𝑖𝑡
,
𝑁𝑖𝑡+1
𝑁𝑖𝑡
,
𝑃𝑖𝑡+1
𝒮
𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝒮 ,
𝑁𝑖𝑡+1
𝒮
𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 ,
𝑝𝑖𝑡+1
𝑝𝑖𝑡
)  such 
that for every municipality 𝑖 and every time period 𝑡: 
i) Local labour markets clear according to equation (2). 
ii) Primary residents and second home investors equalize their indirect utilities across 
municipalities according to equations (3) and (4), respectively.  
iii) Housing markets of primary and secondary residences clear.  
iv) The market of tourism services clears.  
As the dynamic system of equations characterizing local economies can be linearized, we have 
COROLLARY 1. There exists a unique dynamic equilibrium.  
Proof. See Appendix B.   
We can use the dynamic equilibrium to make comparative static predictions about the impact 
of constraining second home investments (i.e. increase their construction costs) on primary and 
second home prices. Let 𝑃𝑖𝑡+1
0,𝑗
 and 𝑃𝑖𝑡+1
1,𝑗
 denote the post-ban price of primary and second homes 
if the ban would not have been/is enacted, respectively. We can express the average treatment 
effect on the treated as 
𝐸(ln(𝑃𝑖𝑡+1
1,𝑗 ) − ln(𝑃𝑖𝑡+1
0,𝑗 ) |𝐷 = 1) = 𝐸 (ln (
𝑃𝑖𝑡+1
1,𝑗
𝑃
𝑖𝑡
𝑗 ) − ln (
𝑃𝑖𝑡+1
0,𝑗
𝑃
𝑖𝑡
𝑗 ) |𝐷 = 1) ,    𝑗 ∈ {𝒫, 𝒮}   (8) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑗
 denotes pre-ban prices and 𝐷 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the municipality is 
subject to the ban and 0 otherwise. We obtain the following propositions, which we test in the 
empirical part of the paper: 
PROPOSITION 1. If primary and second homes are not substitutable, the average price effect on 
primary homes of constraining new second home investments in high-amenity municipalities 
is negative. 
PROPOSITION 2. If primary and second homes are not substitutable, the average price effect on 
second homes of constraining new second home investments in high-amenity municipalities is 
positive. 
Proof. See Appendix B, Table B1.  
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The intuition behind Proposition 2 is straightforward: A constraint (or outright ban) on new 
second homes makes supply more price inelastic, thus capitalizing future demand growth of 
second homes into comparatively higher equilibrium prices. More inelastic supply also implies 
fewer second home investors and this in turn reduces demand for tourism services, lowering 
prices for such services. 
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 1 consider the effects of a constraint (or outright 
ban) on new second homes on the local landscape and the local economy: If local residents 
don’t care much about the disamenity caused by the presence of investors (𝜂 ≈ 0), the 
constraint (ban) hurts the local tourism industry without providing any benefit to primary 
residents, causing wages and the number of residents to be lower in the new equilibrium. This 
negatively impacts the aggregate housing demand for primary homes, leading to a negative 
equilibrium price effect. Now consider the other extreme where local residents care a lot about 
the negative externality imposed by investors (𝜂 ≪ 0). In this case, a constraint (or ban) on 
second home construction attracts local residents into treated municipalities, relative to the 
counterfactual. However, the negative effect of the constraint on wages is now reinforced by 
this increase in the number of residents due to the decreasing returns to scale assumption. 
Despite a comparatively higher number of primary residents, the aggregate housing demand for 
primary residences is lower, explaining the negative price effect in this case. 
In this latter case with 𝜂 ≪ 0 Proposition 1 hinges on the decreasing returns to scale assumption, 
which may be plausible for the local tourism industry. In Appendix B, we explore whether 
Proposition 1 still holds when we instead assume agglomeration economies in the local tourism 
industry. We demonstrate that if agglomeration forces become very strong and exceed a certain 
threshold, a constraint (ban) on new second homes may increase the price of primary homes. 
However simulations suggest that such a threshold is unrealistically high.17     
Propositions 1 and 2 also allow us to identify the winners and losers in the treated areas. 
Proposition 1 implies a negative wealth effect for primary homeowners in treated areas driven 
by the fact that constraining second home investments impose a significant economic cost on 
local residents that is capitalized into lower primary house prices. Since prices are measured as 
the present value of imputed rents, constraining second home investments is also expected to 
lower future rent levels.18 But this does not mean that renters are better-off. This is because the 
fall in rents is commensurate to a decrease local wages. In a spatial equilibrium setting without 
relocation costs, renters should be neither better nor worse off. Proposition 2 implies that 
existing second home investors in treated locations are, on average, better-off. These theoretical 
considerations are consistent with our simple SHI voting analysis. While existing second home 
investors could expect to benefit from the proposed ban, they did not vote in the affected 
municipality and local homeowners at least had a strong incentive to vote against the SHI. 
Indeed, municipalities with high homeownership rates and high second home shares were most 
strongly opposed. 
                                                          
17 See Web-Appendix B for the simulations.  
18 We would not expect a negative effect of the ban on primary house prices in a setting with exogenously 
determined incomes. Consider a retirement community where retirees receive an exogenously determined pension 
income. Retirees will welcome the preservation effects of the ban on the local landscape, whereas local labor 
market considerations are, in the extreme, irrelevant. These considerations could explain the popularity of banning 
second homes in British sea resorts, which are popular with retirees. 
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4.6 Equilibrium prices when primary and second homes are perfect substitutes 
We now consider the case where primary properties and second homes are perfect substitutes. 
In this setting, the price of existing primary and second homes must be the same and, by 
implication, the impact of the ban on the price of existing primary and second homes must go 
in the same direction as well. Although the ban prevents the construction of new second homes, 
it does not prevent second home investors from entering the location. This is because existing 
primary residents have the valuable option to sell their property to second home investors and 
either move away or build a new – cheaper – primary home without conversion option at the 
outskirts of the location.19 Nevertheless, the expected growth rate of the number of second home 
investors should decrease post-ban. This is because eventually the municipality will run out of 
existing primary homes with a conversion option, at which point the ban puts an absolute upper 
limit on the number of second homes.  
In our setting, if the expected growth rate of the number of new second home investors 
decreases, this has a negative feedback effect – via local wages – on local residents. Aggregate 
demand for housing in the local jurisdiction decreases, yet, at the same time, supply of second 
homes (or primary homes with a conversion option respectively) becomes perfectly inelastic.  
The net impact of these two opposing effects on the equilibrium price of houses with a 
conversion option is theoretically ambiguous.  
In contrast to the separate market case, primary homeowners retain a ‘conversion option’ to sell 
their property to second home investors post-ban. How valuable this option for existing owners 
is depends on their moving costs. In the extreme (excessively high moving costs) the option to 
convert is worthless. However, in reality the option may at least partially hedge primary 
homeowners against the adverse effects on the local economy. Put differently, ignoring moving 
costs, primary residents may not be worse-off compared to existing second home investors. 
Interestingly from a policy point of view, in a setting with perfect substitutability, banning 
second homes is likely to reinforce the very problems it is supposed to tackle: The ban reduces 
the willingness-to-pay for housing of local residents due to the adverse effect on local wages. 
The ban thus creates incentives for primary homeowners to sell their properties to second home 
investors, whose willingness-to-pay has not changed post-ban. Some primary residents may sell 
and move away, which would mean that the share of second home investors relative to the total 
local population rises and the ‘ghost town’ problem worsens. Some primary residents may sell 
and purchase newly constructed primary dwellings that do not have a conversion option at the 
outskirts of the location, in effect creating a new separate market of ‘properties without a 
conversion option’ for primary residents. To the extent that existing primary homes are clustered 
mainly in the center of municipalities and new primary homes have to be built at the outskirts, 
this could reduce social cohesion and may even increase sprawl – because a ban on second 
homes does not prevent construction of primary homes at the outskirts. 
 
 
                                                          
19 In theory, lawmakers could retrospectively revoke the right of existing primary residents to sell their homes to 
second home investors. This severely infringes property rights and is thus unlikely. New primary homes built after 
the ban cannot include a conversion option as otherwise the ban would be inconsequential. 
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5 Data and descriptive statistics    
We combine housing data from mortgage lenders provided by the Swiss Real Estate Datapool 
Association (SRED) with municipality-level data from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
(FSO), the Swiss Federal Office for Spatial Development (ARE), and the Swiss Federal Tax 
Administration (FTA). In this section we briefly describe the data and provide summary 
statistics. We provide more detail on the sources and data in the Web-Appendix C.  
5.1 Data sources and variables 
Housing transaction data — Data on individual transaction prices and corresponding housing 
characteristics for all of Switzerland and from 2000q1 to 2015q1 come from the SRED, which 
collects and pools transaction data from various mortgage lenders – both private and cantonal 
banks. For each housing unit, in addition to the transaction price, we know whether the buyer 
intends to use the unit as primary or secondary residence. Moreover, we obtained detailed 
information on the physical characteristics of the unit (number of rooms, number of bathrooms, 
number of parking places, micro-location quality, housing unit quality, housing condition, 
construction year, and an indicator for whether the unit is a single-family house or an apartment) 
and on the unit’s location (municipal and cantonal identification codes and ‘municipality type’).  
Second home rates — We obtained the municipality-level second home rate from ARE. Since 
no official statistics were available right after the approval of the SHI, ARE combined data from 
the Federal Population Census of 2000 – containing an inventory of Switzerland's buildings and 
dwellings – with data from the Federal Register of Buildings and Dwellings of 2011 to compute 
second home shares to determine whether municipalities were affected by the SHI. The number 
of second homes per municipality is calculated as the total housing stock less the number of 
primary homes. Second home rates are thus fixed over the period of our analysis, although some 
municipalities were allowed to revise their rates.  
Municipality characteristics — We obtained municipality-level data on the share of SHI-no 
voters from the FSO. Land-use category data, sourced from the FSO and measured between 
2004 and 2009, allow us to construct a measure for the share of undevelopable land – lakes, 
glaciers, and bedrock – capturing the value of natural amenities in a given municipality. We use 
these two variables – share of no votes and share undevelopable land – to estimate how the 
impact of a second home ban may vary according to the extent to which a municipality relies 
on tourism, and with respect to the value of its natural amenities.  
Geographical Information System (GIS) data on the boundaries of administrative units at 
national, cantonal, and municipal level in 2013 is supplied by the Federal Office of Topography. 
GIS information allows us to compute the distance in km of each municipality from 15 major 
Swiss urban centers and 53 major ski resorts. These two measures capture how households 
value the proximity to major labor markets and natural amenities, respectively. Finally, we 
collected data from the FSO on the number of workers and firms active in the service sector as 
measured in 2011 and on the homeownership rate in 2000. 
Fiscal data — Fiscal data at municipality level comes from the FTA. Annual data is currently 
available from 1995 to 2011. In our analysis, we use the number of taxpayers present in a given 
municipality, the municipality average net income after taxes, and the municipality’s Gini index 
based on this average net income. Additionally, we consider the share of foreign residents in 
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the municipality – only available from 2008 to 2014 – to take into account the share of the 
population represented by foreign individuals paying local taxes. 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
We provide summary statistics of the data in Tables 1A (control group) and 1B (treatment 
group) for the pre (2010-2011) and post (2013-2014) SHI approval periods. For the purpose of 
our regression analysis we aggregate individual transaction data of primary and second homes 
at municipality level in each of the two periods.20 
A comparison of the two samples reveals that the threshold imposed by the initiative essentially 
divides areas with major urban centers (control) from mountainous ones (treatment). Below the 
threshold, municipalities are nearer to major urban centers and more distant to major ski resorts, 
whereas the opposite is true for treated municipalities. Control municipalities thus – on average 
– have more taxpayers and higher salaries. Interestingly, the percentage of individuals and firms 
active in the service sector is similar for the two groups, suggesting that local economies in 
treated places mostly rely on tourism and that agriculture may only play a marginal role. Figure 
2 illustrates the geographic distribution of treated municipalities: most of them are situated in 
or near the Alps, further supporting our claim that for these municipalities the tourist industry 
is the main pillar of their local economies, consistent with our model. Given this proximity to 
the Alps, treated municipalities have more natural amenities, as measured by the share of 
unproductive surface, compared to the control group.    
Treated municipalities have lower average house prices, both before and after the approval of 
the initiative. However, whereas the control places have a positive price trend in the traded 
primary properties pre and post the SHI-approval, the price trend in the treated locations is 
reversed post implementation of the policy. House prices are lower in treated municipalities in 
part because they are further from major urban areas, but in part also because of lower housing 
quality. In treated places traded properties are older, although the difference is not statistically 
significant. Interestingly, we observe an increase in this age differential after the SHI-approval: 
The average age of transacted properties in the control group remained stable. In the treatment 
group however it increased by more than four years. Similarly, the aggregate housing stock 
quality of traded properties in treated municipalities appears to have been adversely affected by 
the ban. 
Two remaining points are worth noting. First, as depicted in Figure 3, the SHI did not noticeably 
affect the pattern of primary housing transactions with respect to second home rates: primary 
homes are mainly transacted in and nearby major urban centers, which typically possess second 
home rates between 10% and 15%. Similarly, very little of the second home demand from the 
above-20%-municipalities appears to have shifted to control municipalities just below the 20% 
threshold. Consistent with this, Table 1A and 1B show that the average number of transacted 
primary homes has not been significantly affected by the policy in treated municipalities. 
Second, as Figure 4 illustrates, prior to the approval of the SHI, the linear time trends of 
(disaggregated) average annual log-prices of transacted primary homes are extremely similar 
below and above the initiative’s threshold. The equality of the trend coefficients cannot be 
                                                          
20 This corresponds to computing bi-annual averages of data for each municipality. Computing averages over two 
years allow us to include a greater number of Swiss municipalities in our sample and to increase the number of 
transactions observed in a given municipality. See the next section for further details.  
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rejected at the standard level, suggesting that the common trend hypothesis implicitly assumed 
in the two period Difference-in-Differences (DD) model may be appropriate. One possible 
explanation for the similarity of the pre-trends is the arbitrariness with which the threshold was 
chosen by the supporters of the SHI. Moreover, consistent with our Proposition 1, after the 
approval of the SHI, log-prices decline for the treated primary properties, while they continue 
to increase for the control units.  
6 Empirical research design 
We carry out a two period analysis by dividing the data into pre (2010-2011) and post (2013-
2014) approval of the SHI. We consider an additional pre period (2008-2009) to include lagged 
independent variables. Individual transaction data is aggregated at the municipality level by 
computing bi-annual averages in these periods. Computing bi-annual averages allows us to 
retain a larger share – approximatively 35% – of all Swiss municipalities in our less restrictive 
specifications and perform robustness checks based on sample restrictions. 
We dropped municipalities from our sample that requested a review and revision of their 
classification as having an alleged share of second homes above 20%. We do so because, during 
our sample period, these municipalities did not need to comply with the ban imposed by the 
initiative.21 This explains the relative lack of observations for second home rates between 20 
and 25%. Additionally, we dropped municipalities that had recently merged, as second home 
rates were not available for these places. This addresses the concern that some municipalities 
may have attempted to manipulate the treatment assignment by merging with municipalities 
that had a second home rate below the threshold. Although the initiative was approved in March 
2012, there was great uncertainty concerning its practical application until August 2012. 
Individuals may or may not have anticipated its effects during this year despite the ordinance 
not being in force, making its evaluation difficult. We thus decided to drop 2012 observations 
from our sample.  
We proceed as follows. In a first step, only predetermined controls – measured before the policy 
implementation – are included in the empirical models. In order to compare only primary homes 
that possess a conversion option before and after the SHI approval, we dropped from our sample 
primary residences built after 2012. We estimate the policy’s net effect on primary house prices 
using a standard Difference-in-Differences (DD) model. We subsequently account for 
unobserved municipality fixed effects by restricting our sample to municipalities observed in 
both time periods and estimate a First Differences (FD) model. The FD model is then 
generalized to allow for differential time trends.22  
In a second step, we re-include primary residences built after 2012 in our sample and also 
consider contemporaneous controls – i.e. local housing characteristics measured at the same 
point of time as local primary house prices. We then estimate a FD mediation model for age-
related characteristics. We review the model’s main identifying assumption as theorized by Imai 
et al. (2010) and Imai et al. (2011) and adopt their estimation strategy. Following Heckman et 
                                                          
21 Virtually all municipalities that requested a revision of their rates were in the end found to be below the threshold 
set by the SHI, although exact rates were not published. As robustness check we included these municipalities 
back in the control group in the FD specification presented below (second home rates are not included as control). 
Results are unchanged (see Table W-D1 in Web-Appendix D).     
22 We do not explicitly present the regression discontinuity design approach in this section, as we simply restrict 
the sample to municipalities that have a second home rate near the threshold value set by the initiative.  
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al. (2013) and Heckman and Pinto (2015), we carry out the analysis using a single latent factor 
as mediator. This factor summarizes all the age-related characteristics into one single variable, 
therefore reducing the model’s parameters and simplifying the interpretation of the findings.  
6.1 Estimating the net impact of the policy with predetermined controls 
Let 𝑃𝑖10−11 and 𝑃𝑖12−13 denote the log of the average price of primary homes transacted in 
municipality 𝑖 in 2010-2011 (pre-period) and 2013-2014 (post-period), respectively. Our 
Difference-in-Differences (DD) specification can then be expressed as  
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛾𝐷𝑖 + 𝜏𝑑𝑡 + 𝛿 𝑑𝑡 × 𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑟𝑖 + 𝜷2𝒄𝑖 + 𝜷3𝒉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜷4𝒛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.           (9)  
The term 𝑆𝑟𝑖 denotes the second home rate of municipality  𝑖,  𝐷𝑖 represents the treatment 
dummy defined as 𝐷𝑖 = 1{𝑠𝑟𝑖 ≥ 0.2}, and 𝑑𝑡 is a time dummy equal to 1 for post-initiative 
observations and zero otherwise. The term 𝒄𝑖 is a vector of time-invariant variables that captures 
various characteristics of the municipality. The vector includes canton fixed effects, 
municipality type, share of unproductive surface, distance from major urban centers, distance 
from major ski resorts, homeownership rates, and share of individuals and firms active in the 
service sector.23 The vector 𝒉𝑖𝑡−1 contains local lagged housing characteristics: number of 
rooms, number of bathrooms, number of parking places, housing quality, housing condition, 
micro-location of the property inside the municipality, age of the property at the time of the 
transaction, share of traded houses (vs. share of traded flats), and number of transacted primary 
properties in the municipality. Finally, the vector 𝒛𝑖𝑡−1 contains lagged fiscal variables: the 
number of taxpayers present in the municipality, the share of foreign residents – i.e. foreign 
individuals paying local taxes in the municipality – the average income in the municipality, and 
the corresponding Gini index – measuring income inequalities inside the municipality. The 
variable 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is a stochastic error term.  
We use our knowledge about the mechanism generating the treatment assignment (i.e., the fact 
that municipalities with a share of second homes equal to or above 20% are affected by the 
policy) to narrow down possible sources of endogeneity. In fact, controlling for 𝑆𝑟𝑖, the 
treatment variables 𝐷𝑖 and 𝐷𝑖𝑡 (= 𝑑𝑡 × 𝐷𝑖) can be considered to be exogenous. Unbiased 
estimation of the coefficient of interest 𝛿 is thus obtained if  𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡|𝑆𝑟𝑖) = 0 (assuming that 
predetermined controls are exogenous too). In particular, this assumption is violated if the 
unobserved municipality heterogeneity 𝑎𝑖 contained in the error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is correlated with the 
second home rate of the municipality. If we decompose the error term as 𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 – where 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the time-varying part of 𝜀𝑖𝑡  – and restrict our sample to repeated observations, we can 
address the endogeneity issue due to time-invariant unobserved variables by estimating the 
following First Differences (FD) model:   
Δ𝑃𝑖13−14 = 𝜏 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖 + 𝜷3Δ𝒉𝑖10−11 + 𝜷4Δ𝒛𝑖10−11 + Δ𝑢𝑖13−14,                       (10) 
Where Δ𝑃𝑖13−14 = 𝑃𝑖13−14 − 𝑃𝑖10−11, Δ𝒉𝑖10−11 = 𝒉𝑖10−11 − 𝒉𝑖08−09, and  Δ𝑢𝑖13−14 =
𝑢𝑖13−14 − 𝑢𝑖10−11. Note that Δ 𝑑𝑡 × 𝐷𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖Δ𝑑𝑡 = 𝐷𝑖. The identifying assumption is 
now 𝐸(Δ𝑢𝑖13−14|𝐷𝑖) = 0. Since 𝐷𝑖  is a deterministic function of the second home rate, we thus 
                                                          
23 See Web-Appendix C for further details. Data on the share of individuals and firms active in the service sector 
was available only for 2011 and thus included in the “fixed” effects category for ease of exposition.  
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must have 𝐸(Δ𝑢𝑖13−14|𝑆𝑟𝑖) = 0, i.e. the (predetermined) second home rate of a municipality 
must be strictly exogenous with respect to the dynamic error terms.   
This assumption is violated, for example, if investors over time increasingly value proximity to 
particular amenities – like prestigious ski resorts – and second home rates proxy for the distance 
to these amenities. Due to the increased labor supply associated with the inflow of second home 
investors, our theoretical model predicts a positive shock of the growth of second home 
investors on the local demand for primary residences in touristic (treated) municipalities. In 
order to address this problem, we allow different time trends for our explanatory variables and 
– in particular – for second home rates. We generalize model (9) by adding post-initiative 
interaction terms with predetermined controls as follows: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛾𝐷𝑖 + 𝜏𝑑𝑡 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽1
′𝑑𝑡 × 𝑠𝑟𝑖 + 𝜷2𝒄𝑖 + 𝜷2
′ 𝑑𝑡 × 𝒄𝑖                (11) 
           𝜷3𝒉𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜷3
′ 𝑑𝑡 × 𝒉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜷4𝒛𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜷4
′ 𝑑𝑡 × 𝒛𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡.                                    
Importantly, by interacting the fixed effects 𝒄𝑖 with 𝑑𝑡, we allow for different time trends at the 
cantonal level, thus partialling out trend differentials of regional housing markets. The 
difference in time trends at the cantonal level may be particularly important in Switzerland, 
since cantons can display different trends in their fundamentals. This generalization leads to the 
following generalization of the FD model (10):  
ΔP𝑖13−14 = 𝜏 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽1
′𝑆𝑟𝑖 + 𝜷2
′ 𝒄𝑖 + 𝜷3Δ𝒉𝑖10−11 + 𝜷3
′ 𝒉𝑖10−11 +                              (12) 
𝜷4Δ𝒛𝑖10−11 + 𝜷4
′ 𝒛𝑖10−11 + Δ𝑢𝑖13−14. 
Over the period of our analysis the second home rate 𝑆𝑟𝑖 was measured using data collected 
before the ordinance came into force, hence, its values are fixed in the pre and post periods. It 
is thus extremely unlikely that 𝑆𝑟𝑖 is correlated with the error term Δ𝑢𝑖13−14 once trend 
differentials have been partialled out, thus making the treatment variable 𝐷𝑖 exogenous.   
6.2 A note on heterogeneous effects and sorting 
In the previous section, we advocate the exogeneity of the treatment assignment 𝐷𝑖 with respect 
to the dynamic shock Δ𝑢𝑖13−14 from the aggregate perspective of municipalities. In fact, due to 
the hardly predictable approval of the SHI and the extremely slow dynamic of second home 
rates, it seems extremely unlikely that municipalities were able to manipulate the treatment 
assignment. From the aggregate perspective of municipalities as treated units, selection bias 
should thus not be a problem. 
However, our theoretical framework predicts a heterogeneous treatment effect 𝛿𝑖  in the market 
of primary residences if the growth in the number of second home investors varies across 
municipalities. Workers might sort into or out of a treated municipality according to the 
expected gain/loss in order to maximize their utility (selection on gains). The main question is 
what the causal effect 𝛿 represents when heterogeneous effects are present. To answer this, we 
must assess whether sorting according to the treatment status is likely or not. Let us consider 
the random coefficient version of model (10): 
Δ𝑃𝑖13−14 = 𝜏 + 𝛿𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝜷3Δ𝒉𝑖10−11 + 𝜷4Δ𝒛𝑖10−11 + Δ𝑢𝑖13−14 =  
                        𝜏 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖 + 𝜷3Δ𝒉𝑖10−11 + 𝜷4Δ𝒛𝑖10−11 + (𝛿𝑖 − 𝛿)𝐷𝑖+Δ𝑢𝑖13−14,     (13) 
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where 𝛿𝑖 represents the heterogeneous (random) effect of the SHI on municipality 𝑖. The 
treatment effect 𝛿 estimated by model (13) may be biased for two reasons. First, there might be 
a potential correlation between omitted variables contained in the error term Δ𝑢𝑖13−14  and the 
treatment assignment 𝐷𝑖. Second, the heterogeneous effect 𝛿𝑖 may be correlated with the 
treatment assignment 𝐷𝑖, i.e. 𝐸((𝛿𝑖 − 𝛿)𝐷𝑖) ≠ 0. This corresponds to the sorting of households 
across municipalities with respect to potential gains.  
If sorting is present, we should observe a shift in the distribution of primary home transactions 
with respect to the municipalities’ second home rates. This, however, is not the case. The 
histogram of transactions presented in Figure 3 shows no evident change in the distribution of 
transacted primary homes, suggesting that sorting from control municipalities to treated ones – 
and vice versa – did not take place. Therefore, our estimates may still be interpreted as an 
average treatment effect, as in the case of homogenous treatment effects.  
6.3 Contemporaneous controls and mediation effect 
We now re-include primary residences built after 2012 in our sample and consider 
contemporaneous differences of housing characteristics as controls in model (10).24 The model 
choice is dictated by its empirical tractability – reduced number of parameters and fewer 
multicollinearity problems – and the fact that the estimated net effects are similar to those 
estimated by its extended version (12). We thus have 
Δ𝑃𝑖13−14 = 𝜏 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖 + 𝜷3Δ𝒉𝑖13−14 + 𝜷4Δ𝒛𝑖10−11 + Δ𝑢𝑖13−14.  (14) 
As illustrated in the theoretical section, banning new second home investors also stops or at 
least reduces the net inflow of primary residents. As a consequence, treated municipalities 
should have a smaller number of transacted new primary homes, affecting age-related 
characteristics of primary residences. These characteristics are “bad” controls as suggested by 
Angrist and Pischke (2009). Estimates of the parameter of interest 𝛿 are biased.  
We next assume that age related characteristics 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 – such as age itself, housing quality, 
housing condition, and micro-location25 –  of the contemporaneous housing differences 
Δℎ𝑖13−14
𝑗
 have been affected by the second home ban:  
Δℎ𝑖13−14
𝑗 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛿𝑗𝐷𝑖 + 𝜷
𝑗Δ𝒛𝑖10−11 + Δu𝑖13−14
𝑗 ,       𝑗 ∈ 𝐽.     (15) 
Two problems arise in this setting. First, we must estimate the indirect effect of the ban – via 
the quality of traded primary residences – on prices and understand under which assumptions 
this estimate may be interpreted causally. Second, the higher the number of age-related 
characteristics, the higher is the complexity of the system of equations. This complexity is 
unwarranted in the present case, as we are not interested in assessing the impact of the ban on 
each individual age-related characteristic.  
                                                          
24 Except for the share of foreign residents, data on fiscal variables post approval of the initiative are not available. 
The term Δ𝒛𝑖10−11 thus includes the fiscal variables for which post information is not available. To keep the 
notation as simple as possible, we included the dynamic share of foreign residents in the term Δ𝒉𝑖13−14. 
25 These four variables are those that constitute the mediation effect. The choice of the age variable is obvious. 
Condition and quality are negatively correlated with age for straightforward reasons. The micro-location is related 
to the age of the housing stock because older houses tend to be situated in the municipality’s center. These localities 
tend to have fewer light-hours and poorer landscape views, explaining their lower value.   
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To solve the second problem, we reduce the number of equations in (15) that have to be 
estimated using factor analysis. Following Heckman et al. (2013) and Heckman and Pinto 
(2015), we assume that contemporaneous controls affected by the policy are all different 
measures of a single latent factor 𝜉. This seems justified in our case since the affected variables 
can all be related to age. Appendix C contains details on the latent factor estimation.   
We now turn to the problem of identifying the mediation effect. Having reduced the number of 
controls being affected by the policy to a single factor, we can rewrite equations (14) and (15) 
as 
Δ𝑃𝑚13−14 = 𝜏 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾Δ𝜉𝑖13−14 + 𝜷3Δ𝒉𝑖13−14
(−𝑱)
+ 𝜷4Δ𝒛𝑖10−11 + Δ𝑢𝑖13−14.      (14’)    
Δ𝜉𝑖13−14 = 𝜏
∗ + 𝛿∗𝐷𝑖 + 𝜷3
∗ Δ𝒉𝑖13−14
(−𝑱)
+ 𝜷4
∗ Δ𝒛𝑖10−11 + Δ𝑢𝑖13−14
∗ ,  (15’) 
where Δ𝒉𝑖13−14
(−𝑱)
 denotes the contemporaneous covariates excluding those being affected by the 
policy. As usual, we capture the policy’s direct effect by 𝛿, whereas the housing covariates’ 
mediation effect can be estimated as 𝛾 ∙ 𝛿∗. This product highlights the two main conditions 
under which a mediation effect is present. First, the policy must affect the latent factor 
summarizing age-related characteristics (i.e. 𝛿∗ ≠ 0 ). Second, the latent factor must have an 
impact on prices (i.e. 𝛾 ≠ 0).   
We now explore, using mediation analysis, under which assumptions the estimated effects can 
be interpreted causally. Estimation of mediation effects – as given by the product 𝛾 ∙ 𝛿∗ – dates 
back to Baron and Kenny (1986).26 Only recently however Imai et al. (2010) and Imai et al. 
(2011) provided the identification assumptions necessary for a causal interpretation of the 
mediation effect.27 This assumption is known under the name of Sequential Ignorability and 
includes two conditions. First, the classic conditional independence assumption must hold for 
both the dependent variable of interest (ΔP) and the mediator (Δ𝜉). Second, conditional on 
predetermined controls and on the treatment, the mediator is ignorable. The validity of the 
Sequential Ignorability assumption cannot be directly tested using the data. To try to overcome 
this problem, Imai et al. (2010) suggest a procedure to assess the sensitivity of the mediation 
estimates to the existence of (unobserved) predetermined confounders, which we carry out in 
the next section.  
 
7 Results 
We first report our main results. Next, we subject these to two robustness checks. We verify that 
municipalities that belong to the control group have not been affected by the policy and that the 
estimated treatment effect was not present before the SHI implementation.   
                                                          
26 Mostly unknown in economics -- and policy evaluation in particular – statistical mediation analysis is has been 
widely used for decades in psychology and other social sciences, whereas mediators are typically represented by 
personality traits affected by some program. 
27 Since both our dependent and mediator variables are continuous – they are averages computed at municipality 
level – the estimation and inference procedures we employ based on Imai et al. (2010) are equivalent to those 
originally suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986).   
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7.1 Main Estimates 
Tables 2 and 3 document pooled cross-sectional DD and panel FD estimates describing the 
impact of the SHI on the average price of transacted primary homes at municipality level, as 
estimated by equations (9) and (10), respectively.28 Both estimation approaches suggest a strong 
negative impact on the price of primary homes: on average, the policy decreased the value of 
primary homes by about 12% to 14%.29 The estimated average treatment effect is highly 
significant independent of the set of controls and extremely stable across DD and FD 
specifications, suggesting an exogeneity of second home rates with respect to municipalities’ 
unobserved fixed effects and – as a consequence – of the treatment assignment.  
Table 4 illustrates the estimated average treatment effects obtained when estimating equation 
(12). Allowing for differences in the trends of the predetermined variables does not significantly 
affect the magnitude of the estimated impact of the policy – the estimated effects are very 
similar to those in Tables 2 and 3 – although larger standard errors due to multicollinearity 
reduce statistical significance. Consistent with this observation, the second home rate interacted 
with a time dummy is statistically insignificant in all specifications, suggesting that its valuation 
into the price of primary homes does not possess a time-trend. Overall, these findings strongly 
suggest that trend differentials are not likely to cause endogeneity issues of the treatment 
variable. Further support for the exogeneity of the treatment variable is provided in Table 5, 
where the sample of municipalities is restricted to those that have a second home rate in the 
[0.1, 0.5] (Panel A) and [0.15, 0.3] (Panel B) intervals, respectively, thus excluding most major 
urban areas and highly touristic municipalities.30 Again, results are in line with those shown in 
Tables 2 and 3, thus providing further evidence that our estimates are likely not plagued by 
potential endogeneity arising from the dynamic component of the stochastic error term.  
Finally, Table 6 presents FD estimates when contemporaneous differences of housing 
characteristics and the share of foreign residents are included in the model. We divide 
contemporaneous controls in two groups depending on their likelihood to be affected by the 
policy: age related and none-age related characteristics. The number of rooms, number of 
bathrooms, number of parking places, share of traded single-family houses, number of 
transacted primary properties31, and share of foreign residents are unlikely to be affected by the 
SHI, whereas age-related characteristics such as age itself, housing quality, housing condition, 
and micro-location are. In fact, we observe a reduction in the magnitude of the estimated effect 
when this latter group of variables is included in the model. A similar effect is obtained when 
the single latent factor summarizing these variables is included, suggesting that the factor 
replicates the behavior of age-related characteristics. This variation in the estimated effects may 
suggest that including age related contemporaneous controls may bias our estimates.  
                                                          
28 We report robust standard errors. Clustering standard errors by period and canton cells in specification (9) – 
cantons are the “most aggregate” institutional entities in Switzerland – does not alter the statistical significance of 
our results, although standard errors are smaller when clustered. Clustering standard errors in specification (10) 
provides virtually the same statistical significance, even though these errors may not be reliable due to the small 
number of clusters. In what follows, we report the most conservative standard errors.  
29 The obtained FD estimates are stable when observations at the municipality level are weighted according to the 
number of transactions observed in 2008/2009. See the Web-Appendix D, Table W-D2. 
30 As apparent from Figure 3, the Panel B-interval corresponds to one of the smallest intervals allowing us to 
provide stable FD estimates (about 50 municipalities belong to the treated group).  
31 Empirically we do not observe a significant drop in the number of transacted primary residences at the 
municipality level.  
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Table 7 illustrates the estimated direct effect of the policy on the price of primary homes – i.e. 
the effect not due to compositional changes in the housing characteristics – and the indirect – 
mediated – effect of age related characteristics as summarized by the latent factor. The direct 
effect on primary home prices is about -7.7% and statistically significant. The indirect effect on 
prices amounts to -2.4% and is significant at the 5% level. It is comforting to find that the total 
effect – which amounts to -10% – is not statistically different from the one estimated using 
predetermined characteristics. The compositional changes due to age-related characteristics 
thus account for nearly a quarter of the total effect. Regarding the validity of the Sequential 
Ignorability assumption, unless a fairly strong positive correlation (greater than 0.5) between 
the error terms of equations (14’) and (15’) is present, the average causal mediation effect 
remains negative and significant.  
Another pertinent question is whether the initiative affected the price of second homes. Only a 
small percentage of second homes are traded below the threshold set by the initiative and these 
are traded only in a small number of control-municipalities. This lack of data makes estimating 
the treatment effect on second homes extremely challenging. DD estimates following 
specification (9) are reported in Table 8.32 Once the characteristics of municipalities are 
included in the model, the sign of the treatment effect – although statistically insignificant – 
suggests a positive effect of the policy on the price of second homes.  
This finding is consistent with our theoretical base model that assumes poor substitutability 
between primary and second homes. This should not be too surprising in the case of 
Switzerland’s touristic areas. Second homes are usually located where access to a ski resort is 
easiest, are built using specific materials –wood-built chalets – and usually lack some of the 
comforts of primary residences, such as access to broadband connection and covered parking 
garages. Additionally, it may be that primary houses that were good substitutes for second 
homes were already converted into second homes during the last couple of decades, leaving 
only properties without conversion potential in the stock of primary residences. 
Another possible explanation is that post SHI-implementation, primary residences that retained 
a conversion option systematically dropped out from our sample – as they were sold as second 
homes – thus causing a selection bias. This seems unlikely for two reasons. First, primary 
residences built before 2012 do retain a conversion option. If they are systematically sold as 
second homes, it means that potential primary residents prefer to buy properties not having the 
conversion option. As the price of second homes did not significantly increase, this could only 
be explained by a change in the preferences of primary home buyers post policy, an unlikely 
case. Second, if primary residences that have a conversion option are systematically converted 
post policy, we should observe a significant drop in the number of transacted primary residences 
in treated municipalities, and this is not the case.33    
                                                          
32 FD estimates are not reported because less than 7 municipalities were present in the control group of the less 
restrictive FD specification, making estimates erratic when including predetermined controls. DD specifications 
shown in Table 8 contain 86, 83, 13, and 13 control municipalities, respectively.  
33 In the implementation of the SHI ordinance, municipalities had to ascertain that the conversion of primary 
residences into secondary ones was not driven by pure speculative reasons. For example, primary homeowners 
were not allowed to convert a primary residence and directly build/buy a new one in the same (or nearby) 
municipality.  
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7.2 Heterogeneous effects of ban on second homes 
Our model implies heterogeneous treatment effects depending on the disamenity value caused 
by the investors’ presence (positive landscape preservation effect) and the local labor output 
elasticity in the tourism sector (negative local economy effect). We empirically investigate this 
heterogeneity by interacting the treatment dummy with two predetermined controls. The first 
control aims to capture the positive landscape preservation effect induced by the second home 
ban. We capture this effect by the share of unproductive surface area (lakes, mountains etc.) 
present in the municipality. The second control represents the economic cost of keeping 
investors away. We proxy for this effect by using the share of no votes against the SHI observed 
in a given municipality. The results are reported in Table 9. The first column of the table shows 
the effect when time trends are not included in the regression model, whereas the last two 
columns do include time differentials together with the opposing effects. The last column also 
adds fiscal variables as controls. Adding time trend differentials substantially increases the 
regression fit, allowing us to identify the individual effects more precisely. The validity of the 
chosen proxies is supported by several facts. First, each individual effect has the expected sign. 
Second, the estimated average net effect is smaller but in line with previous estimates. Using 
the average values reported in Table 1B for the share of no votes and the share of unproductive 
land, we obtain a net effect of 0.259 − 0.802 ∙ 0.61 + 0.665 ∙ 0.23 ≅ −0.073 (treatment 
effects are taken from the last column of Table 9), implying a policy-induced reduction in the 
price of primary homes of 7.3%.  
7.3 Robustness checks 
If second home investors shift their demand to the nearest control municipalities (i.e., the closest 
available substitutes) we may overestimate the average treatment effect. This is because a 
spatial shift of the second home demand might cause primary house prices to increase in the 
control municipalities, thus biasing the absolute magnitude of our estimates upwards. To 
investigate this concern, Tables A2 and A3 in Appendix A document the estimated average 
treatment effects when we use as control group municipalities situated more than 5 kilometers 
away from the nearest treated ones. Reassuringly, the estimated impacts are virtually identical 
to our baseline estimates reported in Tables 2 and 3. 
The choice of a 5km distance band is arbitrary. In a next step we thus vary this distance band 
continuously to document that the estimated effects of our FD specifications – including all 
predetermined controls – are robust to the precise choice of the distance band. The results are 
illustrated in Figure 5. The estimates are extremely stable over a wide range of distance bands 
used to exclude the nearest-to-treated control municipalities, suggesting that the potential 
spatial sorting of individuals across municipalities is not relevant in our setup. These results can 
be explained as follows. First, the entire second home demand in municipalities that did not 
exceed the threshold represents is very small (<0.5% of the total transactions of primary 
residences), thus hardly affecting local primary house prices in non-treated areas. Second, 
investors may value the proximity to amenities – such as ski resorts – and would rather invest 
in another country than losing the benefit of this proximity (i.e., even nearby municipalities 
may not be sufficiently close substitutes).    
Finally, we conduct a placebo test to verify that no treatment effect was present before the policy 
implementation. Specifically we use the years 2006-2007 and 2008-2009 as pre-policy periods, 
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and 2010-2011 as post-policy period.34 Tables A4 and A5 in Appendix A report the estimation 
results for regression models (9) and (10), respectively. The treatment effect is statistically 
insignificant in all specifications, suggesting that no price differential between treated and 
control municipalities was present before the approval of the SHI. Table A6 illustrates placebo 
results when differential time trends are included. Again, the treatment effect is insignificant in 
all specifications. Finally, in Table A7 we report a placebo test on the heterogeneous treatment 
effects. As soon as trend differentials are included in the model, each one of the opposing effects 
is statistically insignificant.35  
 
8 Conclusion  
Rising inequality has led to a global political backlash against wealthy elites. One increasingly 
popular policy is to constrain or impose an outright ban on new second home investments in 
high-amenity places (highly touristic places or superstar cities). We propose a dynamic general 
equilibrium model that describes the mechanisms through which this policy affects primary 
residents and existing second home investors.  
Local residents face a basic trade-off. Constraints on second home investments hurt the local 
economy but provide benefits in the form of landscape preservation effects. Theory suggests 
that the predicted impact on the price of primary homes depends on a number of factors, 
importantly, whether or not primary and second homes are close substitutes, whether or not 
local residents attach a strong disamenity value to the presence of second home investors, and 
the local labor output elasticity in the tourism sector.  
Exploiting the unique empirical setting provided by the unexpected approval of the Swiss 
Second Home Initiative (SHI), we find that the ban induced by the SHI reduced the value of 
primary homes in the affected areas by around 12 percentage points. The estimated effect of the 
ban on the price of second homes is positive, albeit not statistically significant. 
Our findings are consistent with the view that primary homes in Swiss tourist areas are poor 
substitutes for second homes. In a setting with poor substitutability, in the extreme, the option 
to convert a primary residence into a second home is worthless and it does not provide a hedge 
against the negative impact of banning investors.  
When exploring heterogeneous treatment effects, we find that, all else equal, the ban had a 
stronger negative impact on primary house prices in places with strong opposition against the 
SHI (negative local economy effect) and a smaller negative impact in places with more valuable 
natural amenities (positive landscape preservation effect), providing support for our proposition 
that the negative net effect of the SHI-ban is driven by two opposing mechanisms, with the 
adverse local economy effect on average dominating the positive landscape preservation effect.  
Constraining new second home investments hurts local homeowners via lower wages and lower 
primary house prices. Renters benefit from lower rents but overall they are not better off. This 
is because the fall in rents is commensurate to a decrease local wages. In a spatial equilibrium 
setting without relocation costs, renters should be neither better nor worse off. Our empirical 
findings are inconclusive as to whether existing second home investors were beneficiaries in 
                                                          
34 Since no data on the share of foreign residents was available before 2008, we excluded this variable from our 
model.  
35 Additional robustness checks are presented in Web-Appendix D. 
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the treated areas: The estimated effect of the SHI-induced ban on the price of second homes is 
consistently positive, albeit statistically insignificant, possibly due to small sample size issues.  
In light of our findings, it is hardly surprising that local residents in touristic Swiss 
municipalities – particularly homeowners in the most touristic places – were firmly opposed to 
the ban. Interestingly, this is in contrast to the second home-ban in the popular British sea resort 
St. Ives, which was overwhelmingly supported by local residents. We speculate that local 
demographics matter.36 Moreover, existing homeowners may support a ban as long as existing 
primary homes are good substitutes for second homes and homeowners are able to retain a 
conversion option, as was the case in St. Ives. In this case, they may even have a property price 
induced incentive to vote in favor of a ban.  
Our findings hold important lessons for other countries, tourist areas, and superstar cities in 
which inequality has led to a political backlash against the wealthy and, in particular, against 
(foreign) second home investors. Overall, our findings are indicative that constraining second 
home investments may reinforce rather than reduce wealth inequality. While bans do nothing 
to improve local economies, local taxes on the value of land or (investment) property could 
potentially help local economies whilst at the same time preserve the landscape. 
  
                                                          
36 Retirees in high-amenity places may care little about local economic growth prospects but a lot about 
preservation of the landscape. While retirees may be drawn to the mild climate of St. Yves, Swiss ski-resorts are 
more likely to attract a younger crowd. Moreover, the elderly living in the Swiss Alps belong to families that live 
there for generations, so they are likely to have intergenerational motives to oppose a ban and protect the livelihood 
of tourist places. We leave a rigorous analysis of voting behavior for future research. 
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TABLES 
TABLE 1A 
Summary Statistics of Primary Residences – transactions below the 0.2 threshold (control group) 
 2010-2011 (N=1’464) 2013-2014 (N=1’430) 
VARIABLES (municipality level averages) Min Max Mean Sd Min Max Mean Sd 
Price (1'000 CHF) 120.00 3’040 753.14 331.55 120.00 2’880 813.88 332.73 
Housing characteristics         
Number of rooms 2 9 4.86 0.79 2 11 4.75 0.85 
Number of bathrooms 1 4 2.05 0.41 1 4 2.04 0.43 
Number of parking places 1 4 2.81 0.49 1 4 2.75 0.49 
Micro-location (1 to 4, bad to excellent) 1 4 2.91 0.39 1 4 2.76 0.39 
Quality (standard of finishing) (1 to 4, bad to excellent) 1 4 2.97 0.52 1 4 2.85 0.54 
Condition (1 to 4, bad to excellent) 1 4 2.92 0.57 1 4 2.83 0.61 
Age of building at time of transaction† -1 161 27.82 24.70 -1 164 28.60 24.94 
Single-family house (yes/no) 0 1 0.61 0.32 0 1 0.58 0.33 
Number of transactions 1 798 15.32 34.37 1 855 13.54 32.72 
Municipality characteristics         
Second home rate (%) 1.60 19.90 10.55 3.56     
Share of no votes (%) 0.29 0.82 0.50 0.07     
Unproductive surface (%) 0.00 0.87 0.03 0.06     
Distance to major city (Km) 0 75.70 10.51 10.61     
Distance to major ski resort (Km) 0 78.90 34.85 19.34     
Homeowners (%) 0.04 0.83 0.52 0.15     
Pct. of workers in the 3rd sector (%) 0.05 0.99 0.58 0.18     
Pct. of firms in the 3rd sector (%) 0.15 0.94 0.65 0.14     
Fiscal variables         
Number of taxpayers (1'000) 0.07 247.49 2.73 8.95     
Foreign residents (%) 0.01 0.51 0.16 0.09 0 0.53 0.18 0.10 
Mean net income (1'000 CHF) 41.61 328.73 69.01 22.95     
Net income Gini index 0.31 0.81 0.44 0.06     
Note† The age of the building at the time of transaction is defined as the year in which the transaction takes place minus the construction year. Since some dwellings are sold before being 
constructed, the age variable can take negative values. N = Number of municipalities with transactions. 
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TABLE 1B 
Summary Statistics of Primary Residences – transactions above the 0.2 threshold (treatment group) 
 2010-2011 (N=276) 2013-2014 (N=255) 
VARIABLES (municipality level averages) Min Max Mean Sd Min Max Mean Sd 
Price (1'000 CHF) 100 3’366 608.77 366.37 100 2’396 592.07 312.74 
Housing characteristics         
Number of rooms 2 10 4.25 1.19 1 9 4.09 1.18 
Number of bathrooms 1 4 1.85 0.47 1 4 1.79 0.52 
Number of parking places 1.50 4 2.57 0.49 1.67 4 2.56 0.50 
Micro-location (1 to 4, bad to excellent) 1 4 3.09 0.48 1 4 2.89 0.52 
Quality (1 to 4, bad to excellent) 1 4 2.73 0.67 1 4 2.52 0.64 
Condition (1 to 4, bad to excellent) 1 4 2.68 0.71 1 4 2.50 0.75 
Age of building at time of  transaction† -0.83 161 32.57 28.64 0 164 36.91 29.65 
Single-family house (yes/no) 0 1 0.49 0.40 0 1 0.50 0.41 
Number of transactions 1 121 7.12 12.85 1 148 6.25 12.46 
Municipality characteristics         
Second home rate (%) 20.30 86.10 47.88 17.21     
Share of no votes (%) 0.26 0.89 0.61 0.12     
Unproductive surface (%) 0.00 0.95 0.23 0.22     
Distance to major city (Km) 0 102.50 36.77 24.85     
Distance to major ski resort (Km) 0 81 15.29 22.11     
Homeowners (%) 0.21 0.95 0.60 0.14     
Pct. of workers in the 3rd sector (%) 0 0.95 0.62 0.18     
Pct. of firms in the 3rd sector (%) 0 0.94 0.63 0.15     
Fiscal variables         
Number of taxpayers (1'000) 0.02 15.18 1.30 1.72     
Foreign residents (%) 0 0.61 0.16 0.10 0.02 0.61 0.17 0.10 
Mean net income (1'000 CHF) 26.61 98.89 50.76 11.31     
Net income Gini index 0.38 0.71 0.49 0.07     
Note: † The age of the building at the time of transaction is defined as the year in which the transaction takes place minus the construction year. Since some dwellings are sold before being 
constructed, the age variable can take negative values. N = Number of municipalities with transactions.  
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TABLE 2 
DD Estimates 
Log primary home prices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment x Post -0.121** -0.117** -0.125** -0.123*** 
 (0.0562) (0.0502) (0.0490) (0.0451) 
Treatment (main effect) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Second home rate Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cantonal FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality characteristics No Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged housing characteristics No No Yes Yes 
Lagged fiscal variables No No No Yes 
Observations 2,898 2,898 2,898 2,898 
R-squared 0.055 0.456 0.497 0.564 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
TABLE 3 
FD Estimates 
Δ Log primary home prices (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment -0.145*** -0.140*** -0.141*** 
 (0.0379) (0.0367) (0.0369) 
Lagged difference of housing characteristics No Yes Yes 
Lagged difference of fiscal variables No No Yes 
Observations 1,354 1,354 1,354 
R-squared 0.023 0.124 0.125 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
TABLE 4 
FD Estimates with Difference in Trends 
Δ Log primary home prices (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment -0.124* -0.134** -0.118* 
 (0.0719) (0.0648) (0.0681) 
Second home rate Yes Yes Yes 
Cantonal FE Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged housing characteristics No Yes Yes 
Lagged difference of housing characteristics No Yes Yes 
Lagged fiscal variables No No Yes 
Lagged difference of fiscal variables No No Yes 
Observations 1,330 1,330 1,330 
R-squared 0.078 0.267 0.274 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE 5  
FD estimates – Restricting interval of second home rates  
 Panel A: [0.1, 0.5] Panel B: [0.15, 0.3] 
Δ Log primary home prices (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment -0.134*** -0.123*** -0.123*** -0.177** -0.175** -0.164** 
 (0.0471) (0.0465) (0.0468) (0.0752) (0.0695) (0.0714) 
Lagged diff. of housing ch. No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Lagged diff. of fiscal var. No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 647 647 647 183 183 183 
R-squared 0.020 0.129 0.130 0.036 0.112 0.135 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
TABLE 6 
FD Estimates – Contemporaneous housing differences 
Δ Log primary home prices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment -0.118*** -0.100*** -0.0648*** -0.0767*** 
 (0.0371) (0.0279) (0.0232) (0.0239) 
Lagged difference of fiscal variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Contemporaneous differences: not age-related No Yes Yes Yes 
Contemporaneous differences: age-related No No Yes No 
Contemporaneous differences: single factor No No No Yes 
Observations 1,388 1,388 1,388 1,388 
R-squared 0.018 0.381 0.587 0.537 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
TABLE 7 
FD Estimates – Contemporaneous housing differences:  
mediation effect on Δ Log primary home prices 
Effect Mean 95% Confidence Interval 
Mediation Effect -0.024 [-.048, -.002] 
Direct Effect -0.077 [-.122, -.031] 
Total Effect -0.100 [-.149, -.049] 
Pct. of Total Effect mediated 0.237 [.16 ,.482] 
 
TABLE 8 
DD Estimates – Effect on price of second homes  
Log second home prices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment x Post -0.111 0.0796 0.179 0.154 
 (0.157) (0.157) (0.317) (0.285) 
Treatment (main effect) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Second home rate Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cantonal FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality characteristics No Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged housing characteristics No No Yes Yes 
Lagged fiscal variables No No No Yes 
Observations 473 418 273 273 
R-squared 0.007 0.316 0.479 0.630 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE 9 
FD Estimates – Heterogeneous effects 
Δ Log primary home prices (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment  0.162 0.289 0.259 
 (0.203) (0.191) (0.194) 
Treatment x Share no votes -0.563 -0.886** -0.802** 
 (0.371) (0.352) (0.363) 
Treatment x Share unproductive land 0.431 0.701*** 0.665** 
 (0.265) (0.265) (0.268) 
Second home rate No Yes Yes 
Lagged difference of housing characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged difference of fiscal variables Yes Yes Yes 
Cantonal FE No Yes Yes 
Municipality characteristics No Yes Yes 
Lagged housing characteristics No Yes Yes 
Lagged fiscal variables No No Yes 
Observations 1,330 1,330 1,330 
R-squared 0.126 0.278 0.282 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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FIGURES 
 
FIGURE 1 
Voting Results at the Municipality Level with Respect to Second Home Percentage 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
Treatment and Control Groups 
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FIGURE 3 
Histogram of Transacted Primary and Second Homes According to Second Home Percentage 
 
 
FIGURE 4 
Log of Annual Average Transaction Prices  
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FIGURE 5 
Excluding control municipalities within given distance from treated 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Voting Results and Robustness Checks 
TABLE A1:  
Determinants of share of no votes in municipalities with housing transactions in 2010-2011 
Share of no votes All Only control Only treated 
Second home rate 0.1324*** -0.0176 0.2024*** 
 (0.0264) (0.0454) (0.0595) 
Voting turnout 0.0841** 0.0239 0.2334*** 
 (0.0326) (0.0297) (0.0592) 
Average net income 0.0010*** 0.0008*** 0.0013* 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0007) 
Gini coefficient for net income -0.0953 0.0708 -0.2264* 
 (0.0635) (0.0559) (0.1311) 
Number of taxpayers -0.0004*** -0.0006** 0.0087** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0037) 
Share of foreign residents 0.0202 0.0308 -0.0645 
 (0.0288) (0.0247) (0.0735) 
Unproductive surface 0.0314 0.0443 -0.0031 
 (0.0266) (0.0281) (0.0309) 
Share of residents in the service sector -0.0059 0.0002 -0.0059 
 (0.0118) (0.0112) (0.0451) 
Share of firms in the service sector -0.0714*** -0.0783*** -0.0986 
 (0.0207) (0.0193) (0.0834) 
Homeownership rate 0.0809*** 0.0587*** 0.3167*** 
 (0.0169) (0.0151) (0.0675) 
Distance from major CBD -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0012*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) 
Distance from major ski resort -0.0010*** -0.0004*** -0.0031*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0005) 
Cantonal FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,688 1,422 266 
R-squared 0.6453 0.5981 0.6635 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
TABLE A2 
DD Estimates - Control Group more than 5km away 
Log primary home prices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment x Post -0.118** -0.114** -0.128*** -0.129*** 
 (0.0570) (0.0504) (0.0493) (0.0452) 
Treatment (main effect) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Second home rate Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cantonal FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality characteristics No Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged housing characteristics No No Yes Yes 
Lagged fiscal variables No No No Yes 
Observations 2,178 2,178 2,178 2,178 
R-squared 0.085 0.464 0.509 0.582 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE A3 
FD Estimates - Control Group more than 5km away 
Δ Log primary home prices (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment -0.144*** -0.137*** -0.138*** 
 (0.0381) (0.0368) (0.0373) 
Lagged housing characteristics No Yes Yes 
Lagged fiscal variables No No Yes 
Observations 1,021 1,021 1,021 
R-squared 0.029 0.125 0.128 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
TABLE A4 
DD Estimates - Placebo Test 
Log primary home prices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment × Post 0.00550 0.00810 0.00639 0.00982 
 (0.0533) (0.0496) (0.0480) (0.0446) 
Treatment (main effect) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Second home rate Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cantonal FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality characteristics No Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged housing characteristics No No Yes Yes 
Lagged fiscal variables No No No Yes 
Observations 2,947 2,947 2,947 2,947 
R-squared 0.047 0.439 0.474 0.541 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
TABLE A5 
FD Estimates - Placebo Test 
Δ Log primary home prices (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment 0.0203 0.0214 0.0171 
 (0.0310) (0.0287) (0.0287) 
Lagged difference of housing characteristics No Yes Yes 
Lagged difference of fiscal variables No No Yes 
Observations 1,403 1,403 1,403 
R-squared 0.001 0.157 0.161 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE A6 
FD Estimates with Difference in Trends – Placebo Test 
Log primary home prices (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment 0.0585 0.0542 0.0734 
 (0.0702) (0.0617) (0.0632) 
Second home rate Yes Yes Yes 
Cantonal FE Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged housing characteristics No Yes Yes 
Lagged difference of housing characteristics No Yes Yes 
Lagged fiscal variables No No Yes 
Lagged difference of fiscal variables No No Yes 
Observations 1,383 1,383 1,383 
R-squared 0.036 0.282 0.292 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
TABLE A7 
FD Estimates - Placebo Test of Heterogeneous Effects 
Δ Log primary home prices (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment  0.359** 0.235 0.179 
 (0.159) (0.165) (0.170) 
Treatment x Share no votes -0.581** -0.332 -0.184 
 (0.282) (0.313) (0.328) 
Treatment x Share unproductive land -0.283 -0.159 -0.222 
 (0.184) (0.196) (0.193) 
Second home rate No Yes Yes 
Lagged difference of housing characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged difference of fiscal variables Yes Yes Yes 
Cantonal FE No Yes Yes 
Municipality characteristics No Yes Yes 
Lagged housing characteristics No Yes Yes 
Lagged fiscal variables No No Yes 
Observations 1,383 1,383 1,383 
R-squared 0.170 0.287 0.295 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix B: Theoretical results and model extensions 
Symbolic computations presented in this section have been made using Mathematica. 
Proof of Corollary 1 
We prove the existence and uniqueness of the dynamic equilibrium. We start by explicitly 
stating the equations defining the equilibrium according to Definition 1.   
Labor market clearing: 𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
𝛾−1
1−𝛽−𝛾𝛾
𝛾
1−𝛽−𝛾?̅?𝑝𝑖𝑡
1
1−𝛽−𝛾𝐴𝑖𝑡
1
1−𝛽−𝛾𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝛾−1
1−𝛽−𝛾  (B1) 
Primary residents spatial equilibrium: 𝑉𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 𝜂 𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑎   (B2) 
Investors spatial equilibrium: 𝑉𝑡
𝒮 = 𝜃𝑖
𝒮𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 𝜖 𝑊𝑡
𝒮
𝑝𝑖𝑡
1−𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑠,𝑏  (B3) 
Primary residences housing market clearing:  
𝑎𝑁𝑖𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑟𝑖𝑡
= 𝐻 (
(𝑟−𝑔𝑖)𝑃𝑖𝑡
(𝑟−𝑔𝑖
𝑐)(1+𝑔𝑖
𝑐)
𝑡
 
)
𝜌𝑖
   (B4) 
Secondary residences housing market clearing: 
𝑏𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 𝑊𝑡
𝒮
𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝒮 = 𝐻
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 (B5) 
Tourism services clearing: 𝛽
𝛽
1−𝛽−𝛾𝛾
𝛾
1−𝛽−𝛾𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝛽+𝛾
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𝒮
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  (B6) 
Using the dynamic price equation  𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑗 =  (𝑟 − 𝑔𝑖
𝑗)𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑗 (1 + 𝑟)⁄ , 𝑗 ∈ {𝒫, 𝒮},  expressing the 
system of equations in changes, and applying a log-transformation we obtain 
ln (
𝑁𝑖𝑡+1
𝑁𝑖𝑡
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𝑁𝑖𝑡+1
𝒮
𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 ) + ln(1 + 𝑔𝑊𝒮)   (B3’) 
ln (
𝑁𝑖𝑡+1
𝑁𝑖𝑡
) + ln (
𝑊𝑖𝑡+1
𝑊𝑖𝑡
) = (𝜌 + 1) ln (
𝑃𝑖𝑡+1
𝑃𝑖𝑡
) − 𝜌ln (1 + 𝑔𝑐)   (B4’) 
ln (
𝑁𝑖𝑡+1
𝒮
𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 ) + ln(1 + 𝑔𝑊𝒮) = (𝜌 + 1) ln (
𝑃𝑖𝑡+1
𝒮
𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝒮 ) − 𝜌ln (1 + 𝑔𝑐
𝒮)   (B5’) 
1
1−𝛽−𝛾
ln (
𝑝𝑖𝑡+1
𝑝𝑖𝑡
) +
1
1−𝛽−𝛾
ln (1 + 𝑔
𝐴𝑖
) −
𝛽
1−𝛽−𝛾
ln (
𝑊𝑖𝑡+1
𝑊𝑖𝑡
) = ln (
𝑁𝑖𝑡+1
𝒮
𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 ) + ln(1 + 𝑔𝑊𝒮),   (B6’) 
where we have used the notation  
𝑉𝑡+1
𝑉𝑡
= (1 + 𝑔𝑉),
𝑉𝑡+1
𝒮
𝑉𝑡
𝒮 = (1 + 𝑔𝑉𝒮), 
𝐴𝑖𝑡+1
𝐴𝑖𝑡
= (1 + 𝑔
𝐴𝑖
),
𝑊𝑡+1
𝒮
𝑊𝑡
𝒮 =
(1 + 𝑔𝑊𝑆) for the exogenous parameters’ growth. 
As the system is linear in the  endogenous quantities ln (
𝑊𝑖𝑡+1
𝑊𝑖𝑡
) , ln (
𝑃𝑖𝑡+1
𝑃𝑖𝑡
) , ln (
𝑁𝑖𝑡+1
𝑁𝑖𝑡
), 
ln (
𝑃𝑖𝑡+1
𝒮
𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝒮 ) , ln (
𝑁𝑖𝑡+1
𝒮
𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 ) , ln (
𝑝𝑖𝑡+1
𝑝𝑖𝑡
) we can solve it with respect to the exogenous 
parameters  ln(1 + 𝑔𝑉) , ln(1 + 𝑔𝑉𝑆), ln(1 + 𝑔𝑊𝒮),  ln(1 + 𝑔𝐴𝑖), ln
(1 + 𝑔𝑖
𝑐), ln(1 + 𝑔𝑖
𝒮,𝑐), 
𝑎,  𝑏, , 𝜂,  𝜖,  𝜌, 𝛽, 𝛾. Assuming parameters do not take degenerate values, the existence and 
uniqueness of the solution follows from standard linear algebra. 
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Proof of Propositions 1 and 2 
In the previous section we have shown the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium 
describing local economies. We make comparative static predictions about the effect of banning 
second homes (i.e. making their housing supply more/perfectly inelastic) by computing the 
derivative of the equilibrium solution with respect to 𝑔𝑖
𝒮,𝑐. In fact, the post-ban costs of 
providing new second homes increased due to the imposed constraints. Table B1 summarizes 
the impact of the ban on the endogenous variables of the system, with 
𝑐: = −1 + 𝜖 + (−1 + 𝑏 + 𝜖)𝜌 − (−1 + 𝑏)𝛾(1 + 𝜌) + (−1 + 𝑏)𝛽(𝑎 − (1 + 𝜂)(1 + 𝜌)).  
TABLE B1 
Treatment effects – No agglomeration economies 
Variable Comparative static treatment effect Sign  
Wages −
𝑏𝜌(−𝑎 + 𝜂 + 𝜂𝜌)
(1 + 𝜌)𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 < 0 
Primary home prices 
𝑏𝜌
(1 + 𝜌)𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 < 0 
Number of primary 
residents 
𝑏𝜌(1 − 𝑎 + 𝜂 + 𝜌 + 𝜂𝜌)
(1 + 𝜌)𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 ≶ 0 
Second home prices −
𝜌(−𝑏 − 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛽, 𝛾))
(1 + 𝜌)𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 > 0 
Number of investors 
𝑏𝜌
𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 < 0 
Price of tourism services −
𝑏𝜌((−1 + 𝛾)(1 + 𝜌) + 𝛽(1 − 𝑎 + 𝜂 + 𝜌 + 𝜂𝜌))
(1 + 𝜌)𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 < 0 
 
The last column of Table B1 shows the sign of the impact of a constraint on new second homes. 
As stated in Proposition 1, the price of primary homes subject to the ban is lower than its 
counterfactual. The opposite is true for the price of second homes (Proposition 2). We now 
prove the signs of these effects. The assumptions on our model’s parameters are 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜌 > 0 
(output elasticities of input factors and housing supply are positive), 0 < 𝑎, 𝑏 < 1  (housing 
consumption of primary residents and investors is positive but housing does not consume their 
entire budget),  𝜂, 𝜖 < 0 (primary residents and investors are subject to a disamenity effect 
caused by the presence of these latter), and 𝛽 + 𝛾 < 1 (decreasing returns to scale).  
We now turn to the effect of the constraint on the remaining endogenous variables. Let us start 
with the price of second homes. We have that 𝜌(−𝑏 − 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛽, 𝛾)) = 𝜌(1 − 𝑏)(1 −
𝛽 − 𝛾 − 𝛽𝜂)(1 + 𝜌) − 𝜖𝜌(1 + 𝜌) + 𝜌(1 − 𝑏)𝛽𝑎 > 0, as each term of the sum is positive by 
assumption. The overall price effect is thus positive, which proves Proposition 2.  
The effect of the ban on the number of primary residents is uncertain, as it depends on the 
magnitude of the parameter 𝜂 describing the dislike of primary residents for investors. If 
primary residents strongly dislike investors, the ban may succeed in attracting more new 
primary residents than in the counterfactual case due to the comparative increase in the 
endogenous amenity value of the municipality. On the other hand it’s easy to show that if we 
let 𝜂 → 0 the ban effect on the number primary residents is unambiguously negative with 
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respect to its counterfactual: while hurting the local economy, the ban provides no incentive for 
them to move into the municipality. The sign of the other endogenous variables is the same.  
Finally, let us consider prices of tourism services. We have that −𝑏𝜌((−1 + 𝛾)(1 + 𝜌) −
𝛽(1 − 𝑎 + 𝜂 + 𝜌 + 𝜂𝜌)) = −𝑏𝜌(−1 + 𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 + 𝜌) − 𝑏𝜌𝛽(−𝑎 + 𝜂 + 𝜂𝜌) > 0 as each term 
of the sum is positive. The overall price effect on tourism services is thus negative.  
Agglomeration economies and reverse effects 
In the previous sections we have assumed that no agglomeration economies were present and, 
in particular, that returns to scale at the aggregate level were decreasing. We now consider the 
case in which agglomeration economies are present, possibly leading to increasing returns to 
scale in the tourism sector. In particular, we investigate how agglomeration forces may reverse 
Propositions 1 and 2. Following Glaser and Gottlieb (2009), the most straightforward way to 
introduce agglomeration economies in the model is to modify the aggregate production function 
as follows 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝛼𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝛽
𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝛾?̅?𝑖
1−𝛽−𝛾
,      0 < 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 < 1, 𝛽 + 𝛾 < 1, 
where ?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝛼 denotes an agglomeration term depending on the total number of primary residents 
(workers) in the municipality which increases total factor productivity. Importantly, this factor 
is treated as parametrically given to individual firms. We maintain the hypothesis of decreasing 
returns to scale in absence of agglomeration economies.   
Deriving comparative static results when agglomeration economies are present is easy in our 
context. As the term 𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝛽
 is replaced by 𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝛼+𝛽
 in the industry first order conditions and noting 
that non-traded capital ?̅? (the only other term involving the output elasticity 𝛽) drops out from 
the system of equations in changes, we can simply substitute 𝛽 with 𝛼 + 𝛽 in equations B1’ and 
B6’. The new dynamic equilibrium is thus equal to the one in the absence of agglomeration 
economies with 𝛽 replaced with 𝛼 + 𝛽. The resulting comparative static results are shown in 
Table B2.  
We now investigate whether the sign of the impact of the ban on primary homes may be reversed 
and what are the implications for second home prices. The starting point is to investigate when 
the sign of the constant 𝑐 is reversed by 𝛼, i.e. when 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝛾) > 0. One can show 
that  
𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝛾) > 0 ⟺  (−1 + 𝑏)𝛼(𝑎 − (1 + 𝜂)(1 + 𝜌)) > −𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛽, 𝛾). 
Let ?̅? ≔
−𝑐(𝑎,𝑏,𝜖,𝜂,𝜌,𝛽,𝛾)
(−1+𝑏)(𝑎−(1+𝜂)(1+𝜌))
 denote a threshold value of agglomeration economies. This leads 
to the conditions 
𝛼 > ?̅?  if  𝑎 − (1 + 𝜂)(1 + 𝜌) < 0   (Case 1) 
𝛼 < ?̅?  if  𝑎 − (1 + 𝜂)(1 + 𝜌) > 0.   (Case 2) 
Case 2 can easily be dismissed, as it implies negative values of 𝛼. In fact, from the previous 
section we know that  𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛽, 𝛾) < 0. If  𝑎 − (1 + 𝜂)(1 + 𝜌) > 0 this would imply a 
negative threshold  ?̅?. As the agglomeration parameter 𝛼 is assumed to be positive, we discard 
Case 2. This implies that the ban effect on primary home prices (and on wages, and the number 
of second home investors) is reversed only if the agglomeration economies are strong enough. 
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Interestingly, the threshold ?̅? decreases with 𝜂: the more primary residents (comparatively) 
benefit from the ban, the weaker the agglomeration forces must be to create a positive effect of 
the ban on primary home prices.    
TABLE B2 
Treatment effects with agglomeration economies 
Variable Comparative static treatment effect 
Wages −
𝑏𝜌(−𝑎 + 𝜂 + 𝜂𝜌)
(1 + 𝜌)𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 
Primary home prices 
𝑏𝜌
(1 + 𝜌)𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 
Number of primary 
residents 
𝑏𝜌(1 − 𝑎 + 𝜂 + 𝜌 + 𝜂𝜌)
(1 + 𝜌)𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 
Second home prices −
𝜌(−𝑏 − 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝛾))
(1 + 𝜌)𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 
Number of investors 
𝑏𝜌
𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 
Price of tourism services −
𝑏𝜌((−1 + 𝛾)(1 + 𝜌) + (𝛼 + 𝛽)(1 − 𝑎 + 𝜂 + 𝜌 + 𝜂𝜌))
(1 + 𝜌)𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 
 
Let us now consider the effect of the ban on the price of second homes when the effect on the 
price of primary homes is reversed, i.e. when 𝛼 > ?̅?. The sign of the effect is reversed if 
−𝜌(−𝑏 − 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝛾)) < 0. One can show that  
−𝜌(−𝑏 − 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝛾)) < 0 ⟺ 𝛼 < −
𝑏+𝑐(𝑎,𝑏,𝜖,𝜂,𝜌,𝛽,𝛾)
(−1+𝑏)(𝑎−(1+𝜂)(1+𝜌))
=: ?̅?′.  
However, as ?̅?′ = ?̅? −
𝑏
(−1+𝑏)(𝑎−(1+𝜂)(1+𝜌))
, we have that ?̅?′ < ?̅?. Therefore, it is not possible 
to reverse the price effect on second homes if it is already reversed for primary ones. In other 
words, in the presence of strong agglomeration economies causing the ban to comparatively 
increase the price of primary homes, the price of second homes must also be comparatively 
higher.  
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Appendix C: Factor analysis  
Let ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝑗
 denote the 𝑗-th age-related housing characteristic in municipality 𝑖 at time 𝑡. The latent 
factor model is given by  
ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝑗 = 𝜇𝑗 + 𝑙𝑗𝜉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽,    
where 𝜇𝑗 is an intercept term, 𝑙𝑗 is the measure-specific loading, and 𝑣𝑗 is a measurement error 
assumed to be independent across the  ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝑗
 and exogenous with respect to the factor 𝜉. We further 
assume that 𝐸(𝜇𝑗) = 𝐸(𝑣𝑗) = 0 and that 𝑣𝑗 is independent of Δ𝑢𝑖13−14. We estimate 𝜉 by 
accounting for the covariance between the observed controls ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 in a given time period.  
Importantly, in the present context we assume that the intercept term 𝜇𝑗, the loadings 𝑙𝑗, and 
the covariates’ covariance structure – which is a function of Φ = Var(𝜉𝑖𝑡) and Θ = Var(𝜈𝑖𝑡) – 
are time invariant in the periods considered in our analysis, such that the structure of the 
measurements is invariant over time. We estimate these parameters using the covariates ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝑗
  
measured in 2008-2009 and subsequently estimate the latent factor for the 2010-2011 and 2013-
2014 periods. We are then able to compute the factor’s first difference Δ𝜉𝑖𝑡 pre and post the 
approval of the SHI. We test the robustness of our results with respect to this assumption and 
no significant changes were observed when either a different time period was used to estimate 
the parameters, or factor scoring was performed independently in each time period. 
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WEB-APPENDICES 
 
Web-Appendix A: References to Second homes’ policies  
In this section we provide a small selection of non-academic references on second homes 
policies described in the introduction. The list is by no means exhaustive. Rather, the cited 
references provide a brief description of the implemented policies and how they were welcomed 
by the press.  
TABLE W-A1 
Second homes policies around the world 
Country Reference 
UK 
HM Treasury and The Rt Hon George Osborne MP (2015). Spending Review and Autumn 
Statement 2015, Cm 9162. 
Morris, S. (2014). St. Ives council toys with banning outsiders buying holiday homes. 
Guardian, November 17. 
Swerling, G. (2014). St. Ives aims to turn tide on city dwellers with second home ban. The 
Times, November 7. 
The Economist (2016). To the lighthouse. April 2016.  
The Economist (2016). Stay away. May 2016.  
The Guardian (2016). St. Ives backs residents-only home ownership plan in referendum. 
May 2016.  
New York 
Barbanel, J. (2014). New Yourk City Mayor De Blasio Weighs Pied-à-Terre Tax. Wall 
Street Journal, September 23. 
 
Higgins, M. (2013).  Tax-Abatement Changes Affect Many Unit Owners. The New York 
Times, March 26.  
Israel 
Gross, Judah Ari. (2015). Bid to make housing affordable sends buyers scrambling, but 
will it work? The Times of Israel. June 21.   
Singapore 
Harper, J. (2013). Singapore gets tough on foreign property buyers, The Telegraph, Jan 16.  
Shamim, A. (2011). Singapore Extends Housing Measures; Developers Drop. 
BloombergBusiness, January 14.  
France 
Le Parisien (2014). Résidences secondaires: l’Assemblé a voté la hausse de la taxe 
d’habitation. December 3. 
Samuel, H. (2014). Britons face tax hike on coveted French second homes. Telegraph, 
November 4. 
China 
Bloomberg. (2013). Beijing Curbs Second Home Buying as China Cools Property Market. 
Bloomberg News, 30 March 2013. 
Fung, E. (2015). China Lowers Down Payments for Buyers of Second Homes. Wall Street 
Journal, 30 March. 
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Web-Appendix B: Simulations  
Figure W-B1 provides simulation graphs on the comparative static predictions with and without 
agglomeration economies. Different treatment effects corresponding to several agglomeration 
parameters are represented as a function of the disamenity parameter 𝜂 of primary residents. In 
particular, we show that for 𝛼 above a given value, the effect of the ban is reversed. To this end, 
we calibrate our model as follows: 
𝑎 = 0.3, 𝑏 = 0.15, 𝜌 = 1, 𝛽 = 0.7, 𝛾 = 0.2, g𝑐
𝑆 = 0.01. 
The share of housing consumption for primary residents corresponds to rough rule of thumb 
used by mortgage lenders to finance house purchases. We assume second home investors spend 
half of that share for their secondary residences. To simplify we assume a linear housing supply 
function. The assumed output elasticities’ values are standard in the literature. Growth of 
construction costs of second homes are arbitrarily assumed to increase 1% from one period to 
another.  Finally, we assume that investors are less negatively affected by their own presence 
and set 𝜖 = 0.5𝜂. The considered values of the agglomeration parameter 𝛼 are 0 (decreasing 
returns to scale), 0.1 (constant returns to scale), 0.2 (increasing returns to scale but below the 
reverse threshold), 0.5 (increasing returns to scale and above the reverse threshold). 
FIGURE W-B1 
Simulation results – Agglomeration economies and reversed effects 
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The above graphs show how investors’ dislike and returns to scale affect the impact of the ban 
on the endogenous variables of the system. It can be seen that for the considered calibration the 
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ban effects are reversed when the agglomeration parameter 𝛼 is above a given threshold (right 
hand side graphs). This threshold is apparently extremely high for  the considered calibration – 
for 𝛼 = 0.2 the ban effects remain stable – and it seems plausible to assume that in the real 
world agglomeration forces are not that strong. We thus discuss only left hand side graphs in 
detail.   
In line with Proposition 1, the policy effect is unambiguously negative (resp. positive) for 
primary (resp. secondary) residences. Interestingly, we can see how returns to scale of local 
tourism industries magnify or decrease the effect of the ban on local economies depending on 
its effect on the number of residents. For example, if primary residents don’t dislike investors 
much – and their number is comparatively lower post ban – the wage effect of the regulation 
will be more negative in the case of increasing returns to scale (𝛼 = 0.2) than for constant or 
decreasing ones (𝛼 = 0, 0.1). The opposite is true for prices of tourism services. On the other 
hand, if primary residents strongly dislike investors – and their number is comparatively higher 
after the ban – the negative wage (tourism prices) effect for decreasing returns to scale will be 
stronger (weaker) than in the case of increasing return to scale.  
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Web-Appendix C: Detailed Description of Data and Sources 
The present appendix contains detailed information on the sources and definitions of the data 
used in the paper. Web links to data sources are provided at the end of the section.     
Housing transaction data 
Individual transaction data has been provided by the Swiss Real Estate Datapool Association 
(SRED). The proprietary data can be obtained against payment from the association, see 
reference [1] below. Table W-C1 reports the definition of the variables used in the empirical 
part before being aggregated at the municipality level over given time periods or used to sub-
set the data.    
TABLE W-C1 
Description of housing characteristics and data sources 
Variable name Description Values 
Number of rooms Self-explanatory. To aggregate.  1, 2, 3… 
Number of bathrooms Self-explanatory. To aggregate. 1, 2, 3… 
Number of parking 
places 
Self-explanatory. To aggregate. 1, 2, 3… 
Quality 
The property standard: bad, average, good, very good. 
To aggregate. 
1, 2, 3, 4 
Condition 
The property condition: bad, average, good, very good. 
It implicitly describes whether the property needs major 
renovations.  To aggregate. 
1, 2, 3, 4 
Micro-location 
The micro-location of the property inside the 
municipality: bad, average, good, very good. It depends, 
for example, whether the property has an open view, is 
situated in a spot with a lot of sun hours, etc. To 
aggregate. 
1, 2, 3, 4 
Age 
Age of the property at the moment of the transaction. 
Has been computed by subtracting from the transaction 
year the year in which the property has been built. To 
aggregate. Negative values represent properties having 
been sold before being constructed.  
…,-2, -1, 0, 1, 
2, 3… 
House type House versus flat indicator. To aggregate. 0,1 
Primary 
Primary versus secondary residence indicator. Used to 
subset the data.  
0,1 
Municipality 
FSO identifier for municipalities. More detailed 
information is available at [2]. Used to compute 
geographic distances (see below). 
1, 2, 3… 
Municipality type 
FSO identifier for the municipality type (level 1). 
Classifies municipalities with respect to their local 
economy, population, richness, labour market, etc. More 
detailed information is available at [3] and [4]. Used as 
categorical variable.  
1, 2, 3,…,9 
Canton 
FSO identifier for cantons. More detailed information is 
available at [5]. Used as categorical variable. 
1, 2, 3…,26 
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Second home rates 
The text of the SHI ordinance, as well as the methodology used to measure municipalities’ 
second home rates are provided by the Federal Office for Spatial Development (ARE), see [6]. 
Data on second home rates are freely available on their website.  
According to ARE the approach used to compute second home rates – total housing stock less 
primary residences – may overestimate the second home number in some municipalities, since 
not all housing units that are not primary homes are necessarily second homes. They point out 
that a comparison of the Federal Population Census of 2000 and the Federal Register of 
Buildings and Dwellings reveals only minor differences between the two data sets, and the 
classification of municipalities into below and above 20% second homes does not vary across 
the two data sets. In general, the ordinance was applied according to this approximated measure, 
independently of a municipality’s “true” second home rate.  
However, when the draft of the ordinance – that listed all affected (treated) municipalities – was 
made public in August 2012 – municipalities were allowed to request a revision of their second 
home rate if they could document that the one published by the ARE was incorrect. 
Municipalities that opted to propose a revision of their second home rate did not have to comply 
with the restriction imposed by the initiative. About 6% of Swiss municipalities requested a 
revision of their second home rate and virtually all of them were able to provide proof that their 
second home rate was indeed below 20%. The ARE continues to systematically verify and 
update the second home rate of all municipalities. Only very few municipalities that were 
initially assumed to be below the threshold, have subsequently been added to the list of treated 
municipalities. In our analysis we drop all municipalities that were either subject to a revision 
or were subsequently reclassified. 
Municipalities’ characteristics 
Data on municipalities’ characteristics are freely provided by the Federal Statistical Office 
(FSO). The indicators used in the present paper can be directly downloaded using the interactive 
statistical atlas of Switzerland – available only in French and German – see [7]. Table W-C2 
describes the considered variables and the corresponding data sources. When necessary, we 
provide additional information on how data were computed.   
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TABLE W-C2 
Description of municipalities’ characteristics and data sources 
Variable name Description Values 
Vote No  
Share of voters having rejected the SHI on the 11 March 
2012. Provided by the FSO, see [8]. 
[0,1] 
Unproductive surface  
Surface of lakes, mountains, glaciers, etc. present in a 
municipality. Provided by the FSO, see [7]. See below 
for further details. 
[0,1] 
Distance to major city  
Distance to one of the 15 major urban centers of 
Switzerland. See below for further details.  
Km 
Distance to major ski 
resort  
Distance to one of the 53 major ski resorts of 
Switzerland. See below for further details. 
Km 
Homeowners 
Share of homeowners in the municipality as measured 
in 2000. Provided by the FSO, see [7] 
[0,1] 
Percentage of firms/ 
individuals in the 3rd 
sector 
Share of firms and individuals working in the third 
sector. Provided by the FSO, see [7] 
[0,1] 
 
The share of undeveloped developable land has been computed using land-use data measured 
from 2004 to 2009. This time interval corresponds to the time necessary to take areal pictures 
by overflying the whole country’s territory. More up-to-date measurements are presently 
underway and will be available in 2018. The FSO classifies municipalities’ surface into four 
main categories: urban, wood, agriculture, and unproductive surfaces. This latter category 
mainly corresponds to lakes, rivers, glaciers, and bedrock surfaces. Additional information on 
the methodology used to measure and classify land surfaces is available at [9].  
Distances to major city centers and ski resorts have been computed using GIS data provided by 
the Federal Office of Topography, see [10]. Geographic boundaries updated to 2014 were used. 
In particular, distances were computed as the minimal planar distance between the two closest 
points of the considered municipalities’ boundaries. For example, if a municipality is adjacent 
to a major urban center/ski resort, the corresponding distance is equal to zero. The 15 major 
urban centers were identified using FSO information on major agglomerations, see [11]. Table 
W-C3 contains the selected municipalities and their respective population as measured in 2014.  
The 52 major ski resorts were identified using Google results obtained by searching 
‘Switzerland + ski resorts’, to which we added the municipalities of Ste Croix, St Cergue, and 
Le Lieu to represent ski resorts belonging to the district of Jura-Nord Vaudois. Table W-C4 
contains the list of the considered ski resorts. Some of the considered ski resorts belong to the 
same municipality and thus have the same FSO identification number.  
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TABLE W-B3 
Major urban centers (individual municipalities) 
FSO number City Name FSO number City Name 
261 Zürich 230 Winterthur 
6621 Genf 1711 Zug 
2701 Basel 4021 Baden 
351 Bern 371 Biel 
5586 Lausanne 2196 Fribourg 
1061 Luzern 2581 Olten 
3203 St. Gallen 6458 Neuchatel 
5192 Lugano   
 
TABLE W-B4 
Major ski resorts (individual municipalities) 
FSO number City Name FSO number City Name 
1202 Andermatt 3612 Obersaxen 
6031 Verbier 6139 La Tzoumaz 
3851 Davos 3539 Savognin 
5409 Villars-sur-Ollon 6252 Zinal 
584 Mürren 6252 Grimentz 
6300 Zermatt 3982 Disentis 
584 Wengen 1631 Elm 
3575 Laax 1004 Flühli 
6243 Crans-Montana 5411 Les Diablerets 
6290 Saas-Fee 6151 Champéry 
1402 Engelberg 6285 Grächen 
3787 St. Moritz 5061 Airolo 
3871 Kloster-Serneus 6252 Saint-Luc 
3921 Arosa 6252 Chandolin 
6024 Nendaz 6193 Bürchen 
561 Adelboden 3981 Brigels 
3506 Lenzerheide 6135 Ovronnaz 
576 Grindelwald 1501 Beckenried 
3752 Samnau 794 Zweisimmen 
5407 Leysin 6111 Leukerbad 
3732 Flims 6156 Morgins 
783 Hasliberg 584 Mürren 
3357 Wildhaus 3311 Amden 
3986 Tujetsch 5568 Ste Croix 
792 Lenk im Simmental 5727 St. Cergue 
3762 Scuol 5873 Le Lieu 
6082 Anzère   
 
Fiscal data 
Data on municipalities’ fiscal data are freely available on the website of the Swiss Federal Tax 
Administration (FTA), see [12]. Based on individuals liable to pay the Federal Tax, we used the 
average net income and the corresponding Gini index at the municipality level computed 
including both married and not married individuals. We supplemented this data by adding the 
share of foreign residents available at [7].  
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Web-Appendix D: Additional Robustness Checks 
 
TABLE W-D1 
FD Estimates-Including municipalities with revised second home rates in the control group 
Δ Log primary home prices (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment -0.147*** -0.142*** -0.143*** 
 (0.0379) (0.0368) (0.0369) 
Lagged difference of housing characteristics No Yes Yes 
Lagged difference of fiscal variables No No Yes 
Observations 1,419 1,419 1,419 
R-squared 0.021 0.128 0.129 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
TABLE W-D2 
FD Estimates – 2008/2009 Weights 
Δ Log primary home prices (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment -0.110*** -0.113*** -0.111*** 
 (0.0306) (0.0298) (0.0298) 
Lagged difference of housing characteristics No Yes Yes 
Lagged difference of fiscal variables No No Yes 
Observations 1,354 1,354 1,354 
R-squared 0.021 0.115 0.119 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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